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Series Introduction
This China Maritime Report on Djibouti is the first in a series of case studies on China’s “overseas
strategic strongpoints” (海外战略支点). The strategic strongpoint concept has no formal definition,
but is used by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials and analysts to describe foreign ports with
special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese
firms.1 Each case study examines the characteristics and functions of port projects developed and
operated by Chinese companies across the Indian Ocean region.2 The distinctive features of these
projects are: (1) their strategic locations, positioned astride major sea lines of communication
(SLOCs) and clustered near vital maritime chokepoints; (2) the comprehensive nature of Chinese
investments and operations, involving coordination among state-owned enterprises and private firms
to construct not only the port, but rail, road, and pipeline infrastructure, and further, to promote
finance, trade, industry, and resource extraction in inland markets; and (3) their fused civilian and
military functions, serving as platforms for economic, military, and diplomatic interactions.
Strategic strongpoints advance a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership objective to become a
“strong maritime power”3 (海洋强国)—which requires, inter alia, the development of a strong
marine economy and the capability to protect “Chinese rights and interests” in the maritime domain.4
With the notable exception of the sole overseas People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Djibouti, all
of the facilities examined in this series are ostensibly commercial. Even the Chinese presence in
Djibouti has some major commercial motivations (addressed in detail in this study). However,
China’s strategic strongpoint model integrates China’s various commercial and strategic interests,
facilitating Chinese trade and investment with the host country while also helping the PLA establish
a network of supply, logistics, and intelligence hubs across the Indian Ocean and beyond.

For an overview of this concept, see Conor Kennedy, “Strategic Strongpoints and Chinese Naval Strategy.” Jamestown
Foundation China Brief 19, no. 6 (March 22, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-strong-points-and-chinesenaval-strategy/.
2
Currently planned case studies include Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu in
Myanmar. None of these other commercial port projects has any PLA military facilities to date, but Chinese analysts
discuss each as a potential strategic strongpoint.
3
This objective is enshrined in the 18th and 19th CCP National Party Congress reports (2012, 2017), as well as the PRC’s
13th “Five-Year Plan” for Economic Development (2016). See: 胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告
[“Hu Jintao's Report to the 18th Party Congress”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 8, 2012,
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151.html; 习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告
[“Xi Jinping's Report to the 19th Party Congress”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], October 28, 2017,
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1028/c64094-29613660.html; 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规
划纲要 [“Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for PRC Economic and Social Development”], 新华社 [Xinhua], March 17,
2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016lh/2016-03/17/c_1118366322_11.htm.
4
习近平在中共中央政治局第八次集体学习时强调：进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略海洋 推动海洋强国建设不断取
得新成就 [“Xi Jinping at the Central Committee Politburo Eighth Study Group, Take a Step Toward Considering
Maritime Consciousness, Maritime Strategic Management, Promote the Construction of Maritime Power, Constantly
Reaching New Achievements”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], July 31, 2013,
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c1024-22401311.html.
1

Summary
This report analyzes PRC economic and military interests and activities in Djibouti. The small, east
African nation is the site of the PLA’s first overseas military base, but also serves as a major
commercial hub for Chinese firms—especially in the transport and logistics industry. We explain the
synthesis of China’s commercial and strategic goals in Djibouti through detailed examination of the
development and operations of commercial ports and related infrastructure. Employing the “Shekou
Model” of comprehensive port zone development, Chinese firms have flocked to Djibouti with the
intention of transforming it into a gateway to the markets and resources of Africa—especially
landlocked Ethiopia—and a transport hub for trade between Europe and Asia. With diplomatic and
financial support from Beijing, PRC firms have established a China-friendly business ecosystem and
a political environment that proved conducive to the establishment of a permanent military presence.
The Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission that justified the original PLA deployment in the region is now
only one of several missions assigned to Chinese armed forces at Djibouti, a contingent that includes
marines and special forces. The PLA is broadly responsible for the security of China’s “overseas
interests,” for which Djibouti provides essential logistical support. China’s first overseas strategic
strongpoint at Djibouti is a secure commercial foothold on the African continent and a military
platform for expanding PLA operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
Introduction: A Foothold in the Western Indian Ocean

Image 1. Major Indian Ocean Shipping Lanes5

China’s most important SLOCs run from the mainland across the South China Sea, through the
Malacca Strait, and across the east-west trunk route of the Indian Ocean. Passing into the western
5

Source: MarineTraffic vessel density 2016-2017, showing tanker and cargo vessels over 75,000 tons gross tonnage.
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Indian Ocean, China’s “maritime lifeline” (海上生命线) splits in two.6 One route heads northwest
through the Strait of Hormuz and into the Persian Gulf, the source of some 40 percent of China’s
imported oil;7 the other continues westward to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, with Djibouti at its
entrance—and beyond it, the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and major markets of the Mediterranean and
Europe. With rising demands on the PLA to “protect the security of China’s overseas interests,”8
especially these vital SLOCs and chokepoints, the requirement to sustain out-of-area operations has
made some form of foreign basing posture virtually inevitable.
China is steadily enhancing its ability to project power and secure the western end of this lifeline.
Since it began regularized, U.N.-sanctioned anti-piracy escort task forces deployed to the Gulf of
Aden in December 2008,9 the PLA Navy (PLAN) has developed experience in conducting and
sustaining limited operations in the “far seas.”10 Not long after Japan established its first overseas
facility in Djibouti in 2011 (joining the U.S., France, and Italy as military tenants of the tiny, former
French colony on the Horn of Africa), China seized the opportunity to augment its own presence.11
Beginning in 2012, with construction of a commercial port in partnership with the government of
Djibouti, and culminating in the development of a military base adjacent to it, China developed its
“first overseas strategic strongpoint” in Djibouti.12
While the circumstances that led to the establishment of a formal, dedicated military base at Djibouti
are unlikely to be replicated at other sites, that base should be considered as one critical node in an
emerging network of overseas port facilities that serve both strategic and commercial purposes.13 As
a lone base unsupported by other Chinese bases or allies, Djibouti does not yet offer the PLA
This is a common designation for this critical SLOC in Chinese strategic writing. See, for example, 肖晞 [Xiao Xi], 中国
国家安全面临的挑战与战略选择 [“China’s National Security Challenges and Strategic Choices”], 薄贵利, 主编 [Bao
Guili, ed.], 强国宏略: 国家战略前沿问题研究 [Grand Strategies for Strengthening the Nation: Research on the
Forefront Issues of National Strategy] (Beijing: People’s Press, 2016), p. 505; 胡冬英, 黄锐, 蔡广友 [Hu Dongying,
Huang Rui, and Cai Guangyou], 推进潜艇兵力走向远洋的几点思考 [“Several Thoughts on Advancing the Submarine
Force to Distant Oceans”], 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering], no. 1 (2017), p. 2.
7
Tim Gould, Tae-Yoon Kim, “The world can’t afford to relax about oil security,” International Energy Agency,
September 19, 2019, https://www.iea.org/commentaries/the-world-cant-afford-to-relax-about-oil-security
8
“Protecting the security overseas interests” (保护海外利益安全) is one of eight “strategic tasks” (战略任务) outlined in
the 2015 PLA White Paper. See PRC State Council Information Office, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 27, 2015,
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm
9
十年, 中国海军护航编队执行护航任务 1190 批次 [“In Ten Years, the Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces has Carried
Out 1,190 Escort Missions”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], December 24, 2018,
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1224/c1011-30484891.html.
10
See Andrew S. Erickson, Austin M. Strange, “No Substitute for Experience,” CMSI Red Book, no. 10 (2013),
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/12/
11
Vice Admiral (ret.) Michael Franken, then in command of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, recounts that
the PRC Ambassador to Djibouti and PRC defense attaché to Ethiopia approached him at a social event in late 2011 and
requested a visit to the U.S. military base at Camp Lemonnier, where they hoped to tour the facility and discuss how the
United States had helped Japan establish its military presence in Djibouti (Author interview with Franken, March 2020);
Alex Martin, “First Overseas Military Base Since WWII to Open in Djibouti,” The Japan Times, July 2, 2011,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/07/02/national/first-overseas-military-base-since-wwii-to-open-indjibouti/#.XmlonqhKiUk.
12
刘琳 [Liu Lin], ‘一带一路’ 沿线战略支点与军事外交建设 [“Strategic Strongpoints Along the ‘Belt And Road’ and
Building Military Diplomacy”], 世界知识 [World Knowledge], July 26, 2017, http://m.dunjiaodu.com/waijiao/1562.html.
13
For a detailed discussion of the establishment of the facility, see Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick DeGategno,
“China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base,”
Center for Naval Analyses, July 2017, https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1038215.
6
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significant wartime capability.14 Instead, it serves largely as a supply, logistics, and intelligence hub
for increasingly complex peacetime military operations across China’s Indian Ocean lifeline, now
anchored in the east by China’s cluster of artificial island bases in the South China Sea.15 The PLA
Academy of Military Science’s authoritative 2013 Science of Military Strategy advocated for such a
pattern:
[W]e must build overseas strategic strongpoints that depend on the homeland, radiate into the
surrounding areas, and move toward the two oceans [i.e., the Pacific and Indian Oceans].
[Each strongpoint] will provide support for overseas military operations or act as a forward
base for deploying military forces overseas, exerting political and military influence in
relevant regions, and forming a posture with the homeland strategic layout that accounts for
both the interior and the exterior, links the near with the far, and mutually supports the
other.16
Chinese officials and analysts are quick to distinguish PRC “strategic strongpoints” from traditional
military bases, contrasting a benign PLA overseas presence with the bases owned by other
countries—especially the “hegemonic” system of U.S. military bases on foreign soil.17 According to
Chinese officials, the Djibouti “support base” (保障基地) is intended to “fulfill international
obligations,” by providing humanitarian relief, supporting Chinese peacekeeping in Africa, assisting
ongoing anti-piracy missions, and “maintaining peace and stability in Africa and the world.”18
A leading Chinese maritime strategist offered the analogy of Imperial Germany’s naval base at Qingdao, which was also
isolated and thus quickly seized by Japan and the United Kingdom in World War I (Author discussion with Hu Bo,
Director of the Centre for Maritime Strategy Studies at Peking University, February 2019). Section V below offers a fuller
assessment of the military capability provided by the base.
15
侯昂好 [Hou Anghao], 超越马汉: 关于中国未来海权道路发展的思考 [“Beyond Mahan: Thoughts on the Future
Development Path of Chinese Seapower”], 国防 [National Defense], no. 3 (2017), pp. 45-54; 陈贞国 [Chen Zhenguo], 三
沙: 打造海上丝路战略支点 ["Sansha, Creating a Maritime Silk Road Strategic Strongpoint”], 世界知识 [World Affairs],
no. 12 (2016), pp. 52-53.
15
郑崇伟, 高成志, 张仲, 孔洁, 万勇 [Zheng Chongwei, Gao Chengzhi, Zhang Zhong, Kong Jie, Wan Yong], 岛礁跑道
设计中的风候特征分析 [“Wind Climate Analysis Under the Demand of Reef Runway Construction”], 海洋预报
[Marine Forecasts] 34, no. 4 (August 2017), pp. 52-57; Zheng Chongwei, et al.,经略 21 世纪海上丝绸之路’: 综合应用
平台建设 [“The Strategy of Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century: Construction of Integrated Application Platform”], 海
洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development and Management], no. 2 (2017), pp. 52-57.
14

寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy], (Beijing: Military Science Publishing, 2013), p.
254.
17
According to several well-placed Chinese analysts, “the Chinese government is very cautious in representing its
strategic strongpoints, and takes pains to distinguish them from American bases overseas, stressing that as a prerequisite
they do not threaten the security and sovereignty of the port country, building only necessary security and defense
capabilities, building strategic strongpoints at key areas, coordinating the construction of a regional security system, and
ensuring the smooth and secure trade between the host country and China. This is the necessary national security
connection for overseas-invested Chinese firms, although this goal is still a long-term one.” 国观智库政策研究中心“一
带一路”课题组 [Grandview Think Tank “Belt and Road” Research Group], “一带一路”中国海外港口项目战略分析报
告 [“‘One Belt One Road’ Chinese Overseas Port Projects Strategic Analytical Report”], 国观智库[Grandview
Institution], (2019), p. 3. See also 吴敏文 [Wu Minwen], 大国海外军事基地地图 [Map of Great Powers’ Overseas
Military Bases”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], June 6, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/globe/2018-06/06/c_137212406.htm.
16

国防部谈中国驻吉布提保障基地:为了更好履行国际义务 [“Ministry of Defense talks about China’s Support Base in
Djibouti: In Order to Better Fulfill International Obligations”], 人民日报 (People’s Daily), November 30, 2018,
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1130/c1011-30434450.html; 吉布提军事基地是海外扩张第一步？ 外交部回应
[“Is the Djibouti military base the first step in overseas expansion? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Responds”], PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/chn/zfgx/zfgxdfzc/t1477374.htm. The facility is
18
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Benign or not, the emerging PLA support system overseas is unlikely to mirror America’s. Instead, it
will follow the PRC’s commercial presence to support its expanding portfolio of military missions.
PLAN Commander Admiral Wu Shengli described this process even as the base in Djibouti was
being built. At a navy seminar held on the eighth anniversary of the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission
(December 2016), he explained “overseas strategic strongpoint construction provides a new support
for escort operations…. [W]e must give full play to the supporting role of the overseas support
system to carry out larger scale missions in broader areas and to shape the situation.” 19
This report examines the development of this “overseas support system,” tracking China’s broader
efforts to “shape the situation” by establishing a robust overseas commercial, diplomatic, and
military presence in Djibouti. While the military base appropriately attracts the lion’s share of foreign
scrutiny, it cannot be understood without examining the role of the Chinese firms that preceded it. By
building and operating the necessary infrastructure—both physical and diplomatic—these firms
established the PRC’s position in Djibouti and paved the way for a major Chinese strategic footprint
in Africa.
Section one introduces Djibouti’s strategic geography and the Chinese “Shekou Model” of
comprehensive development of trade and industry at port sites. Section two describes the
characteristics of the Chinese-operated port and free trade zone at Djibouti. Section three takes stock
of the transport infrastructure built to service the port and expand its economic and strategic impact.
Section four analyzes the inland markets and resources that this transport network intends to access.
Section five assesses the functions and capabilities of the new Chinese military base in Djibouti. The
case study provides a detailed examination of Chinese military and commercial operations at
Djibouti and provides a template for future analysis of other potential “overseas strategic
strongpoints.”

A New “Shekou” in Djibouti
Chinese firms see Djibouti as a major transshipment hub and a key to unlocking the economies of the
Horn of Africa—most notably, landlocked Ethiopia. The managing director of the leading Chinese
firm in Djibouti, China Merchants Port Holdings Company Ltd. (CMPort), explains this vision,
noting that Djibouti “is very close to the major Asia-Europe shipping route and is an important
gateway port for the hinterland countries within the region.”20 Together with the China Export Import
Bank (Exim Bank), CMPort and its parent company, the central state-owned enterprise (SOE) China
Merchants Group (CMG),21 have established a platform of finance, infrastructure, and trade that
enables many Chinese firms to pursue business in a once unappealing economic environment.22

sometimes called a “logistics and supply base” (后勤补给基地), a “support base” (保障基地), or simply a “military base”
(军事基地).
梁庆松, 王元元 [Liang Qingsong, Wang Yuanyuan], 海军召开亚丁湾护航 8 周年研讨会 [“The Navy Holds a
Seminar on the 8th Anniversary of the Gulf of Aden Escorts”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], December 30, 2016, p. 1.
20
Julien Wagner and Oliver Caslin, “‘Investment is not limited to ports’: Jingtao Bai, director general of China Merchants
Port Holdings,” The Africa Report, March 20, 2019, https://www.theafricareport.com/10475/investment-is-not-limited-toports-jingtao-bai-director-general-of-china-merchants-port-holdings/
21
“Central SOEs” are the 95 firms under the direct supervision of the PRC State Council’s State-Owned Assets and
Administration Commission (SASAC). See PRC State Council, 企业名录 [“Central State-owned Enterprise Directory”],
November 8, 2019, available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/n2641579/n2641645/index.html.
22
Prior to the influx of major investment, there were very few private Chinese businesses operating in Djibouti. The
Ministry of Commerce’s 2018 guide on investment in Djibouti stated there were only two Chinese restaurants, and a small
Chinese grocery store for the 2,000 Chinese nationals in country. See 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南 – 吉布提 (2018 版)
19
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With an estimated $15 billion total Chinese investment in development of the port and its
hinterlands, China is the largest external commercial player in Djibouti.23 The relatively large PRC
commercial presence reflects, at least in part, Western absence. Western analysts have repeatedly
questioned the feasibility of the Djiboutian government’s proposed infrastructure projects,24 and
expressed concerns about its large government debt load.25 China, by contrast, has not balked at the
financial risk inherent in investing in Djibouti and has fast become the nation’s principal economic
partner and creditor.26 Djibouti’s president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, said in April 2017 that, “no one but
the Chinese offers a long-term partnership in Djibouti.”27 China-Djibouti relations were upgraded to
a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” when Guelleh visited China in November that year.28
Djiboutian authorities hope the partnership with the PRC will transform Djibouti into the
“Singapore” or “Dubai of East Africa.”29 The CMG President touted his firm’s success in
Guangdong as a “template for development in Djibouti,” where they seek to leverage the
“transformative power of ports.”30 This transformation entails building transport infrastructure,
industrial parks, free trade and export processing zones, and developing commercial services and
residential areas adjacent to the port. CMPort markets this style of comprehensive development as
the “Shekou Model” (蛇口模式).31 This business model derives its name and inspiration from
[“Guide to Foreign Investment Cooperation by Country (Region) (2018)”], 中华人民共和国商务部 [PRC Ministry of
Commerce], 2018, p. 3, 6, http://obor.sh-itc.net/article/fxffnew/gbznnew/201903/1467957_1.html.
23
“‘One Belt One Road’ Chinese Overseas Port Projects Strategic Analytical Report,” pp. 10-11; “Strengthening Djibouti
Port’s Strategic Position,” Port de Djibouti, July 4, 2015, http://www.portdedjibouti.com/strengthenin-djibouti-portsstrategic-position/
24
An aspirational Djiboutian government report from 2017 lays out an ambitious aim to become the logistical and
commercial hub for East Africa. Republique de Djibouti, “Vision Djibouti 2035,” http://www.ccd.dj/w2017/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Vision-Nationale.pdf.
25
The IMF reported in December 2018 that “The Djiboutian authorities’ strategy of investing in infrastructure to transform
the economy and position the country as a logistics and commercial hub offers great opportunities for economic growth
and development. However, the financing of this strategy through a build-up of debt has resulted in debt distress, which
poses significant risks. Public and publicly guaranteed debt is expected to be around 104 per cent of GDP at end-2018.”
See: “IMF Staff Concludes the 2018 Article IV Consultation Mission in Djibouti,” IMF Press Release No. 18/486,
December 19, 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/12/19/pr18486-djibouti-imf-staff-concludes-the-2018article-iv-consultation-mission; Monte Reel, “Djibouti Is Hot: How a Forgotten Sandlot of a Country Became a Hub of
International Power Games,” Bloomberg, March 23, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-djibouti; Mary
Harper, “Can Ethiopia's Railway Bring Peace to Somalia?” BBC, November 23, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-34871074.
26
International Monetary Fund, “Djibouti, 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report, No. 19/314, October
2019, https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2019/1DJIEA2019002.ashx; John Hurley, Scott Morris, and
Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” Center
for Global Development Policy Paper, no. 121 (March 2018), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debtimplications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf.
27
Francois Soudan, “No One but China Offers a Long-term Partnership in Djibouti: President Guelleh,” TesfaNews, April
11, 2017, https://www.tesfanews.net/president-guelleh-only-china-offers-long-term-partnership-djibouti/.
28
Guide to Foreign Investment Cooperation by Country (Region) (2018).
29
See also Edmund Blair, “China to Start Work Soon on Naval Base in Djibouti—Guelleh,” Reuters, February 2, 2016.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-djibouti-china- idUKKCN0VB1Z6; Frank Kane, “The Man Who Wants to Make Djibouti
the Next Dubai,” The National, March 17, 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/business/the-man-who-wants-to-makedjibouti-the-next-dubai-1.46688
30
Deng Yanzi, “Building the Shekou of East Africa,” China Daily, March 27, 2017,
http://www.chinadailyasia.com/asiaweekly/2017-03/27/content_15592240_2.html.
31
林佳铭, 章强 [Lin Jiaming, Zhang Qiang], 招商局港口‘前港—中区—后城’模式的海外拓展之旅 [“The Overseas
Expansion of China Merchants Port’s ‘Port in Front–Zone in the Center–City in the Rear’ Model”], 中国港口 [China
Ports], no. 3 (2019), pp. 25–29. Author interviews with CMPort managers, Hong Kong, June 2019.
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Shekou, once a tiny fishing village in China’s Guangdong Province. CMG developed a seaport and
export processing zone there in the early 1980s, propelling neighboring Shenzhen’s growth into a
world-class commercial, financial, and industrial hub.32 The firm is now promoting this model in the
small east African nation of Djibouti. The core of this effort is a cluster of ports and associated
railway, pipeline, and road infrastructure that are designed to “make Djibouti the Shekou of East
Africa—for regional shipping, logistics, and trade,” in the words of CMG President Li Xiaopeng.33
This phased development model is also described in shorthand as a “port-park-city” model (前港, 中
区, 后城). This signature CMG approach to port development is designed to facilitate not just the
transportation of goods, but to foster a wider business ecosystem that supports broader
development.34 By clustering industrial, logistics, and business service facilities adjacent to the port
of Djibouti, Chinese firms hope to replicate the extraordinary success of Shenzhen.35 The CMPort
managing director calls attention to his firm’s “past the pier” development efforts that “are not
limited to ports but [include an] international free trade zone and urban development called the
Shekou ‘port-park-city’ comprehensive development model.”36
Djiboutian authorities are enthusiastic about the “innovative model implemented by China
Merchants” and quite naturally seek the same extraordinary growth.37 Yet Djibouti manifestly lacks
most of the advantages enjoyed by Shenzhen. The Shekou port complex on Shenzhen’s western
periphery is nested among the massive population centers of Hong Kong and Guangzhou. It sits in
the heart of the Pearl River Delta, the commercially vibrant zone at the center of the PRC export
miracle,38 where it enjoys the benefits of a massive labor pool, productive export-facing industries,
and growth-oriented, technocratic governance. These benefits are largely unavailable on the Horn of
Africa. Still, Djibouti is a vital gateway to a large part of the African continent with a rapidly
expanding population, which may be poised to develop robustly with sound investment and
economic planning. What Djibouti lacks in terms of pre-existing economic development may be
partially compensated for by serving as an especially important ocean access hub for the Horn of
Africa.

Deng Yangzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou’,” China Daily, March 7, 2017,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2017-03/07/content_28455386;for detailed discussions of the model and its
applications, see Lin and Zhang, “The Overseas Expansion of China Merchants Port;” 孔晓青[Kong Xiaoqing], 招商港口
发展“蛇口模式”的形成 [“Formation of the China Merchants Port 'Shekou Model' of Development”], 国家航海 [National
Navigation], (November 2017, pp. 39-54; 何继江, 刘宁 [He Jijiang, Liu Ning], 蛇口模式:一种社会技术创新 [“Shekou
Model: A Type of Social Innovation of Technology”], 特区经济 [Special Economic Zone Economies], no. 12 (2014), pp.
53-57.
33
Deng Yanzi, “Building the Shekou of East Africa.”
34
余舒虹 [Yu Shuhong], 招商蛇口：“前港，中区，后城”蛇口模式加快复制 [“China Merchants’ Shekou: ‘Port in
Front, Industrial Parks in the Middle, City in the Back’ The Shekou Model to be Quickly Replicated”], 经济观察网
[Economic Observations Net], October 24, 2016, http://www.eeo.com.cn/2016/1024/292959.shtml
35
Deng Yanzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou’,” China Daily, March 7, 2017,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/07/content_28455386.htm; Wagner and Caslin, “Investment is not
limited to ports.”
36
Wagner and Caslin, “Investment is not limited to ports.”
37
Aboubaker Omar Hadi, chairman of the Djibouti Port and Free Zone Authority, quoted in 高江虹[Gao Jianghong], “蛇
口模式 4.0” 落地吉布提, 招商局雁形出海 [“‘Shekou Model 4.0’ Arrives in Djibouti, China Merchants ‘Flying Geese’
Model Goes Abroad”], 21 世界经济报道[21st Century Business Herald], July 5, 2017,
http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2017-07/05/content_65726.htm
38
See Ezra Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
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China’s approach to Djibouti takes advantage of hundreds of other Chinese firms, private and stateowned, which are clamoring to do business in the growing African market.39 PRC policy fosters and
advances such overseas investment. CMG, for instance, enjoys substantial backing from Beijing in
the form of access to a large pool of loan capital from central policy banks (like Exim Bank) and
local financing,40 including targeted Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) lending from the “Silk Road
Fund” and other central- and local-government external trade and investment initiatives to promote
the project.41 Further central support for Chinese firms to build a commercial presence in Africa
comes through the diplomatic and political boost provided by government programs, particularly the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the BRI.42
Li Guofeng, director of the Overseas Business Department of CMG, explained how his firm is
positioning itself with respect to the BRI, for which the firm’s leadership has been a leading
proponent:43
[T]he situation in many developing countries along the “Belt and Road” is similar to that in
Shekou at the beginning of reform and opening up, such as the advantages of low labor costs
and low land costs. But the reason why companies are unwilling to invest is because the
infrastructure and soft business environment of many countries is still relatively poor.
Therefore, China Merchants hopes to provide a platform for Chinese-funded enterprises to
feel a similar investment environment in China in this region, and to allay their concerns
about going global.44
This comprehensive approach—in which Chinese financing, expertise, and labor are poured into
integrated port, infrastructure, and industrial projects—is driven in part by China’s ongoing need to
shed excess domestic industrial capacity. Vast investment in domestic industry, especially during the
stimulus following the global financial crisis of 2008, yielded a surplus of labor and capital in several
A detailed accounting of Chinese firms’ commercial presence in Africa, including data and analysis on trade,
investment, and construction contracts, is available on the Johns Hopkins University’s China Africa Research Initiative
website at http://www.sais-cari.org/other-data. See also Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China
in Africa, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
40
The Belt and Road Initiative has created incentives for local governments and SOEs to pile into infrastructure
investment by providing cheap loan capital. See 孙丽朝 [Sun Lichao], 中欧班列挤‘泡沫’ [“Crowding into the ChinaEurope Rail ‘Bubble’”], 等深线 [Depth Paper], July 26, 2019, cited in Ryan Manuel, “Twists in the Belt and Road,”
China Leadership Monitor, Fall 2019, no. 61, https://www.prcleader.org/manuel-belt-road.
41
According to the deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the PBOC and other central organs are
supporting special funds and rates for Chinese banks and other lenders to facilitate BRI priorities. See 陈雨露 [Chen
Yulu], 书写 ‘一带一路’ 投融资合作新篇章 [“Writing a New Chapter in ‘Belt and Road’ Investment and Financing
Cooperation”], 全球商业经典 [Global Commerce Classic], no. 6 (2019). For analysis of which firms are getting BRI
loans, see Li Xiaojun and Zeng Ka, "To Join or Not to Join? How Chinese Firms View the Belt and Road Initiative,"
Pacific Affairs, 92, no. 1 (2019), pp. 5–26.
42
姚桂梅 [Yao Guimei], “一带一路”建设下的中非产能合作 [“China-Africa Production Cooperation in Construction of
the ‘Belt and Road’”], 中国共产党新闻网 [Communist Party of China News Network], July 18, 2017,
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0718/c191095-29412141.html.
43
CMG President Li Jianhong gave a keynote speech at the fifth anniversary party for the BRI, joined by Politburo
Standing Committee member and State Council Vice Premier, Han Zheng. See 黄玥, 张敏彦 [Huang Yue, Zhang
Minyan], 共建“一带一路”，习近平提出从“大写意”到“工笔画” [“Jointly Build the Belt and Road: Xi Jinping proposed
moving from ‘large freehand brushstrokes’ to ‘meticulous detail’”], 新华社 [Xinhua], August 28, 2018,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2018-08/28/c_1123341344.htm.
44
Gao, “‘Shekou Model 4.0’ Arrives in Djibouti.”
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key sectors.45 This surplus is now directed toward foreign markets through a series of policy
measures, of which the BRI is only the most widely promoted.46 Overcapacity in traditional heavy
industries, such as steel, cement, and shipbuilding, and in infrastructure construction sectors, such as
ports, roads, bridges, and railways, has been a policy concern for PRC economic planners for nearly
a decade.
The agenda for the 2012 Central Economic Work Conference, for instance, included discussions of
ways to productively employ this excess industrial capacity to bridge the growing demand-supply
gap while policy makers undertook structural adjustments to the national economy.47 Thus, when the
CMG President noted that “China’s port industry should export its capacity to overseas markets
where the demand for port construction is strong,”48 he was voicing one of the principal domestic
rationales for China’s investments in the Horn of Africa. Alleviating this overcapacity will be
essential to avoid economic headwinds created by the many structural ailments in China’s national
economy, including debt over-accumulation, bankruptcies, lay-offs, and continued damage to the
environment.49
The success of the Shekou model depends on more than pouring surplus capital and excess industrial
capacity into building and operating a port and adjacent free trade zone. Like the Pearl River Delta in
China, these projects must be connected to the broader economic region in order to achieve anything
like the economic dynamism of Shenzhen. Accordingly, if Djibouti is to become a regional transport
gateway and transshipment hub, it will do so largely on the strength of its links to the continent.50
Ethiopia in particular is an attractive market for the possibilities it presents for long-term
development. Though Djibouti itself has a tiny population with little economic potential of its own,
its geographic position provides the opportunity to unlock youthful, fast-growing Ethiopia’s potential
in global markets.51 Djibouti’s ports are well situated to provide commercial access to land-locked
Ethiopia, and as a transshipment hub for cargo moving from the west across the Indian Ocean to
markets in South and East Asia and from the east through the Red Sea and Suez Canal to markets in
45

Most notable among the sectors and products with overcapacity is the construction industry. There is also noted
overproduction of aluminum, cement, chemicals, coal, coal-fired power, paper, plated glass, shipbuilding, solar power, and
steel. See International Monetary Fund, “People’s Republic of China: 2017 Article IV Consultation, Staff Report,” IMF
Country Report, no. 17.247, p. 18.
46
An authoritative statement of this objective to actively undertake major infrastructure and industrial projects abroad that
would further facilitate the export of various Chinese products can be found in a 2013 directive, State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 国务院关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾的指导意见 [“Guiding Opinions of the State Council on
Resolving Serious Production Overcapacity Conflicts”], 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [The Central People’s
Government of the PRC], October 6, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-10/15/content_2507143.htm
47
张前荣 [Zhang Qianrong], 我国当前产能过剩的现状、原因及应对政策 [“The Current Status, Causes, and Policy
Responses to China’s Current Production Overcapacity”], 经济预测部-国家信息中心 [Economic Forecasting
Department—National Information Center], July 16, 2014, http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/455/3068.htm
48
Deng Yanzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou.’”
49
He Yafei, “China’s Overcapacity Crisis Can Spur Growth Through Overseas Expansion,” South China Morning Post,
January 7, 2014, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1399681/chinas-overcapacity-crisis-can-spurgrowth-through-overseas.
50
“Construction of Djibouti’s third sea port begins,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 28, 2012,
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=989990683&Country=D
51
Ethiopia made peace and restored full diplomatic relations with Eritrea in July 2018, and the two vowed to open their
borders for trade, giving the nation another potential access point to the oceans. The infrastructure and economic
relationships for such a development are possible over the medium- to long-term. See Bob Koigi, “Somalia, Eritrea and
Ethiopia seek economic integration,” Africa Business Communities, July 7, 2018,
https://africabusinesscommunities.com/news/somalia-eritrea-and-ethiopia-seek-economic-integration/.
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North Africa and Europe.52 Building the modern infrastructure to do so will be a long-term endeavor.
However, the implementation of the Shekou Model in East Africa has already achieved significant
progress, leaving China poised to take advantage of the market potential and resources of the Horn of
Africa.

Port Capacity and Characteristics
The ports in Djibouti consist of several facilities surrounding the Gulf of Tadjoureh, which cuts into
the east African coastline just southwest of the Bab al-Mandeb. Several of them were in place well
before the Chinese appeared on the scene in 2013, and were formerly operated under an exclusive
2006 concession to the United Arab Emirates’ firm Dubai Ports World (DPWorld), which Djibouti
disputed beginning in 2012 and terminated in 2018 (discussed below).53 Since then, China’s active
development of Djibouti’s transport sector has positioned Chinese firms to continue expanding their
role in Djibouti’s port- and military-base dependent economy.

Image 2. The Port of Djibouti

Edith Mutethya, “Djibouti Launches China-built Free Trade Zone,” China Daily, July 6, 2018,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/06/WS5b3f03d0a3103349141e12a9.html.
53
DPWorld took the government of Djibouti to the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) in 2018 after
Djibouti nationalized the Port of Djibouti in February of that year. DPWorld has received five orders from LCIA in its
favor, including monetary compensation and restoration of their concession. The government of Djibouti has rejected
these awards, physically seized the asset, restructured its management, and passed legislation that allows it to “terminate
all contracts relating to strategic infrastructures which are deemed to be contrary to the fundamental interests of the
Republic.” DPWorld has also brought CMPort to the Hong Kong Court of First Instance, which is still being tried. All of
these facts are presented with documentation in “Decision,” DPWorld Djibouti FZCO, Dubai (International) Djibouti FZE,
Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, High Court of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, Court of First Instance, Action no. 1951 of 2018, December 20, 2019,
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=126220&QS=%24%26%2340%3Bdji
bouti%26%2341%3B&ID=AAAB73AAIAAAXpuAAC&TP=JU.
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Doraleh Multipurpose Port
The Doraleh Multipurpose Port is the centerpiece of China’s economic position in Djibouti. It is
owned and operated by a joint venture between CMPort (with 23.5 percent equity) and the public
port authority of the Djibouti government, Port de Djibouti, S.A. (PDSA), finalized in December
2012.54 The facility went into service in May 2017,55 shortly before the formal opening in July of the
PLA base that abuts its western flank.56 The joint venture gives CMPort a stake in ownership and
operations across all the dispersed facilities of the Port of the Port of Djibouti, comprising not only
the modern container terminal formerly operated by DPWorld (the Doraleh Container Terminal), but
also the Horizon Oil Terminal, the “old port” in the city of Djibouti, Tadjourah Terminal across the
Gulf to the northwest, and Ghoubet Port, a salt terminal in the far west of the Gulf.57 See Image 2
above.
The port was the culmination of a 4-year, $590 million project financed by China’s Exim Bank.58
China State Construction Engineering Corp and China Civil Engineering Construction Corp designed
and built the port between 2013 and 2017.59 The port has six 1200 meter ship berths, from 15.3 to
15.5 meters deep, that take container, dry bulk, breakbulk, and RO/RO cargos.60 They accommodate
100,000 deadweight ton “Capesize” vessels too large to transit the Suez Canal, which must offload to
smaller ships at a transshipment hub before cargo can travel to the Mediterranean and beyond.
Supporting the berths are a 23-hectare container terminal, a 57-hectare cargo yard, a 20-hectare bulk
terminal, a 15-hectare vehicle yard, and 3.5-hectare warehousing area. The total capacity for noncontainerized cargo is 8.8 million tons.61
The port’s performance, at least measured in terms of container throughput, is not currently trending
toward “Dubai” or “Shekou” status. In 2018, the Doraleh Multipurpose Port moved only 49,000 TEU
of containerized cargo out of a designed capacity of 220,000 TEU.62 The CMPort 2018 annual report
attributes this 7.5 percent year-on-year reduction in container throughput in Djibouti to decreases in
招商局国际有限公司 [China Merchants Holdings (International) Company Limited], “Acquisition of 23.5% interests
in Joint Venture in Djibouti,” The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, December 30, 2012,
https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2012/1230/ltn20121230025.pdf
55
“Djibouti’s Doraleh Port Officially Opens,” Xinhua, May 24, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201705/24/c_136312120.htm.
56
张庆宝 [Zhang Qingbao], 我驻吉布提保障基地部队进驻营区仪式举行 [“Ceremony for the entry of our troops into
the Djibouti Support Base”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], August 1, 2017, http://www.81.cn/hj/201708/01/content_7699505_5.htm.
57
Port de Djibouti, S.A., https://www.portdedjibouti.com/
58
International Monetary Fund, Djibouti Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation—Debt Sustainability Analysis,
February 7, 2017, 3, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2017/dsacr1787.pdf; The Export-Import Bank of China,
中国进出口银行与招商局集团有限公司签署战略合作协议 [“The Export-Import Bank of China and China Merchants
Group Sign a Strategic Cooperation Agreement”], 中国进出口银行 [The Export-Import Bank of China], December 16,
2016, http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/Newlist/index_343_29632.
59
“Djibouti’s Doraleh Port Officially Opens;” 亚吉模式: 铁路全产业链成功实践 [“The China-Ethiopia Model: A
Successful Framework for End-to-End Railway Construction”], 中国土木工程集团有限公司 [China Civil Engineering
Construction Corporation], May 22, 2017, http://ccecc.crcc.cn/art/2017/5/22/art_7609_1136232.html.
60
Except where otherwise noted, data on port characteristics and capacity are from IHS Markit, “Djibouti,” Seaweb Ports,
World Port Number: PO1478, UNLOCODE: DJJIB
61
IHS Global Limited, “Djibouti (World Port Number PO1478)” Sea-web Ports (accessed March 17, 2019); “Doraleh
Multi-Purpose Port,” Port de Djibouti, S.A., http://www.portdedjibouti.com/doraleh-multi-purpose-port/.
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TEU is twenty-foot equivalent units, a measure of port throughput based on the average volume of an intermodal
container. See: “Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast, Annual Report 2019” Drewry
Maritime Research, p. 165
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transshipment volume to Ethiopia—that is, precisely the opposite effect of that anticipated by the
business model.63 Despite reductions in service prices after the opening of the Doraleh Multipurpose
Port, Ethiopia is pursuing a policy to diversify its international trade routes and is in discussions with
the Republic of Somaliland to develop Berbera Port, where DPWorld is active after being jettisoned
from Djibouti. Such developments could weaken the virtual monopoly Djibouti currently holds on
Ethiopian trade routes to the sea.64 Nonetheless, the CMPort Interim Report for 2019 (the latest
available as of April 2020) reports increases in container throughput of 11.1 percent and an increase
of 23.4 percent in bulk cargo volume in the first half of 2019.65
Tadjourah
Across the Gulf to the north, the Tadjourah bulk terminal is another of the assets in CMPort’s joint
venture. Djibouti’s port authority anticipates traffic of 4 million tons of cargo per year,66 but there is
little reporting in Chinese or industry sources on its operations. The terminal’s construction was
contracted to a Hubei-based company and was designed to export potash from northern Ethiopia via
rail from Semere. Construction at the port began in December 2012 and was completed in 2017.
However, the anticipated rail connection was never completed, and the port has no major road
connection, so Tadjourah port appears to sit idle.
Ghoubet
The Ghoubet mineral terminal was built by China Harbor Engineering Corporation between 2013
and 2017. With $64 million in preferential loans from China’s Exim Bank, this terminal was
designed to export 5 million tons per year of processed salt from Djibouti’s nearby Lac Assal,
reported to contain around 2 billion tons of salt minerals that had previously been harvested only in
small quantities through traditional methods.67 China Communication Construction Company
purchased 65 percent of a local salt developer and established the Djibouti Salt Investment Company
Ltd. to industrialize the scale of extraction and export. China Communication Construction Company
has exclusive rights for 50 years to develop the local salt and bromine resources.68

“China Merchants Port Holding Company, Ltd. Annual Report 2018 (Summary),” China Merchants Port Group Co.,
Ltd., 2019, http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN201903291311713389_1.pdf.
64
Birhanu Fikade, “Djibouti Offers 45% Price Cut in Services of Newly Built Multiuse Port,” The Reporter, December 7,
2017, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/djibouti-offers-45-price-cut-services-newly-built-multiuse-port;
“Economic Transformation in Djibouti—Systematic Country Diagnostic,” World Bank Group, October 2018,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/437351549918326165/pdf/djibouti-scd-english-version-final-approved-vlogo02062019-636852600790519539.pdf.
65
“China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Interim Report 2019,” 2019, p. 8,
http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2019-09/20190923043626360.pdf
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“Port of Tadjourah,” Port de Djibouti, SA, https://www.portdedjibouti.com/port-of-tadjourah/
67
PRC Ministry of Commerce, 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南–吉布提 (2018 版) [“Foreign Investment Cooperation
Country (Region) Guide—Djibouti—2018 Edition”], 走出去公共服务平台 [Go Out Public Service Platform],
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201902/201902010334033.pdf, p. 21; PRC Ministry of
Commerce, 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南 – 吉布提 (2013 版) [“Foreign Investment Cooperation Country (Region)
Guide—Djibouti—2013 Edition”], 驻吉布提经商参处 [Economic and Commercial Counselor in Djibouti], August 21,
2014, http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/201408/20140800705794.shtml.
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中交吉布提盐业投资公司获吉阿萨尔盐湖溴化钠项目特许经营权 [“China Communication Construction Company
Djibouti Salt Investment Co., Ltd. Was Granted Special Operating Rights for the Djibouti Lake Assal Sodium Bromide
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Africa Report, August 21, 2018, https://www.theafricareport.com/541/djibouti-small-country-big-stakes/.
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None of these bulk terminals is operating near capacity, moving only 4.4 million tons in volume in
2018 out of a capacity of almost 20 million tons across all of the facilities.69 However, this volume
was increasing at a rate of 23.4 percent year-on-year at the time of CMPort’s last official report in
2019. The firm attributes the growth to “increasing import demand for relevant raw materials driven
by small-scale infrastructure projects in Ethiopia.”70 Still, given that the ports handled 6.52 million
tons in 2016, the new facilities do not appear to be spurring the desired cargo volume.71
Non-PRC-operated Ports
Prior to CMPort’s arrival in 2012, the DPWorld-developed Doraleh Container Terminal and the “old
port” were the principal Djiboutian ports. The old port is currently being renovated by CMPort and
the Fujian branch of a British real estate firm, with designs on making it a residential and retail
zone.72 The Doraleh Container Terminal opened in 2008 and initially served as Djibouti’s only
modern container port facility, with a designed capacity of 1.5 million TEU. Since the government of
Djibouti dissolved its joint venture with DPWorld and nationalized the facility in 2018, there has
been some controversy as to what rights CMPort’s joint venture grants it in this new entity.
The ongoing row between Djibouti and DPWorld raises the question of how much influence China
exerts on the Djiboutian government. It seems more than coincidence that relations between
DPWorld and the government of Djibouti soured as CMPort entered into a “Strategic Partnership
Agreement” with the Djiboutian port authority in December 2012. This issue is part of litigation
currently underway in both Hong Kong and London.73 DPWorld alleges that in November 2012,
CMPort began negotiating “substantive terms” with the Djiboutian port authority to remove
DPWorld nominated directors from their joint venture with Djibouti. In 2017, Djibouti’s legislature
passed a law allowing it to renegotiate strategic infrastructure deals and by February 2018, Djibouti
had terminated its joint venture with DPWorld. Djibouti then seized the port assets under a newlyformed public port operating company, Société de Gestion du Terminal à Conteneurs de Doraleh
(SGTD).74 Despite some reports that CMPort is “asserting control of operations at Doraleh Container
Great Horn Investment Holding, “Maritime,” http://www.ghih.dj/maritime.
“China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Interim Report 2019,” p. 8.
71
“China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Annual Report 2016,” p. 15.
72
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Port and Djibouti Sign Cooperation Framework Agreement for Djibouti Old Port Reconstruction Project”], April 26, 2019,
https://www.cmsk1979.com/news.aspx?type=9&id=7684; 邵轶菁 [Shao Yijing], 招商蛇口发力非洲市场，Savills 荣获
吉布提老港项目策略顾问委任 [“China Merchants Shekou Powers African Markets, Savills Appointed as Strategic
Advisor to Djibouti Old Port Project”], Savills, August 22, 2019.
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See “Decision,” High Court of Hong Kong; the London Court of International Arbitration hearings and awards are not
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operating rights; Djibouti has rejected all of the awards. See, Costas Paris, “Djibouti Rejects Court Ruling to Hand Back
Container Terminal,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/djibouti-rejects-court-ruling-tohand-back-container-terminal-11579296713. The Hong Kong case is also the first instance of a Chinese SOE being sued
in Hong Kong by a multinational firm. For details, see 高锋 [Gao Feng], ‘带路’公案：跨国公司告国企 [“‘BRI’ Case:
Multinational Firms Vs. State-Owned Enterprises”], 自由亚洲电台 [Radio Free Asia], February 11, 2019,
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/jingmao/gf1-02112019095745.html; see also “Decision,” High Court of Hong
Kong.
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For an agreed timeline of the various stages of DPWorld’s feud with the Djiboutian government, see “Appendix,”
“DPWorld Djibouti FZCO, Dubai (International) Djibouti FZE, Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. China Merchants Port
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Terminal,”75 the firm is not operating the facility at present and Djiboutian officials deny it will do so
in the future.76 There has been speculation CMPort will take over operations based on its 16% stake
in the former Doraleh Container Terminal joint venture (through its 23.5% stake in Port de Djibouti,
S.A.), or as part of a renegotiation of Djiboutian debt to China’s Exim Bank.77
The status of that container terminal remains obscure in the midst of ongoing litigation in London
and Hong Kong. However, CMPort’s joint venture partner is the Djiboutian port authority, the public
entity responsible for port policy and granting concessions in the ports sector. According to the
World Bank, “there is no clear chain of command or collaboration” for the port authority, which
“falls under the direct supervision of the President [of Djibouti].”78 Chinese leaders and managers
have forged close connections with President Guelleh,79 who has been enamored of Chinese
investment since visiting CMPort’s Shekou facilities in 2012.80 His daughter is a Mandarin-speaker,
and his top economic advisor, his half-brother Saad Omar Guelleh, is the head of the Port de
Djibouti, S.A.81 In displacing Dubai, China is plainly the preferred partner for Djibouti’s ports and is
likely to continue to consolidate its dominant commercial position in the years ahead.
Horizon Djibouti Fuel Terminal
This terminal lies west of the Doraleh Container Terminal, and serves as the conduit for some 95
percent of Djibouti’s hydrocarbon needs, including those of the various military tenants of the
country.82 It was developed by the Emirates National Oil Company (with public and private
investment from Djibouti and Kuwait) and consists of a long jetty out to two deep-water berths that
accommodate tankers of a maximum 80,000 DWT with up to a draught of 18 meters.83 Ashore it
connects to a tank farm for storage and limited processing of petroleum products (including aviation
Costas Paris, “China Tightens Grip on East African Port,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2019,
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fuels), chemical and vegetable oils, and liquid petroleum gases.84 Capacity limitations for growing
hydrocarbon demand have led to a new agreement with Ethiopia to build another oil terminal. No
PRC participation in this project is reported.85
Free Trade Zone
To the southwest of Doraleh Multipurpose Port is the 48.2 km2 Djibouti International Free Trade
Zone, a trade and logistics park intended to attract firms to the area to use the port and its connecting
infrastructure (see Image 3 below). This zone was formally established in March 2015, when CMG
and the Djibouti Ports & Free Zone Authority signed the “Djibouti Free Trade Zone Project
Cooperation Framework Agreement.”86 Three Chinese firms (the Dalian Port Authority, CMG, and
IZP Technologies) are partners in operating the zone. The Dalian Port Corporation began
construction of the Free Trade Zone in January 2017.87 This initial phase is confined to a 2.4 km2
“pilot zone” that accounts for $370 million of a planned $3.5 billion investment in a 48 km2 zone,
claimed to be Africa’s largest.88

Image 3. The Djibouti Port-Park-City89

China’s stake in the Free Trade Zone is controlled through two joint venture entities established in
January 2017 (Lac Assal Investment Holding Company Ltd. and East Aden Holding Company Ltd.).
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At the time of their creation, CMPort granted a loan of “up to $150 million” with an aggregate term
not to exceed 10 years, yielding 40 percent and 26.7 percent equity interests in these joint ventures.90
Both joint ventures are also involved in upgrading port facilities and planning and building
surrounding industrial zones.91 According to CMPort, these ventures initially invested $12.3 million
in the two Free Trade Zone joint ventures.92 Then, in January 2019, CMPort and two other CMG
subsidiaries (China Merchants Investments Limited and Cheer Signal) announced they would inject
an additional $30 million in capital.93
The Free Trade Zone is divided into four “industrial clusters.” One is focused on the logistics
industry and will support provision of transport, bonded warehousing, logistics and distribution
capabilities. Another will focus on “business industry” functions, such as bulk goods transactions,
merchandise display, and duty-free retail. A third cluster will focus on the “business support” sector
and cater to financial services, information services, hotels, office buildings, and training. Finally, a
manufacturing cluster will support packaging, light processing of raw materials, food processing, and
auto parts assembly.94 The idea, in short, is to generate trade to enable the port to prosper.
The Djibouti International Free Trade Zone remains in early Phase I and no major facilities or
operating industrial sites appear to have been constructed.95 However, 21 companies are reported to
have signed agreements to operate in the zone.96 Prior to its limited opening, energetic promotion of
business opportunities was underway in China, with Djiboutian officials and Chinese executives
touting the convenience and market access that the unfinished zone is to support.97 The Chairman of
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Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority stated in 2017 that the zone would become a flourishing
business district “in the next few years,” and other officials have said the port can be expected to
handle $7 billion in trade during its first two years.98 The business operations have not yet met
expectations, but the infrastructure to support such development is increasingly intact.

Inland Transport Infrastructure
Chinese firms have plans to develop extensive infrastructure to connect Djibouti’s ports to key
elements of the Ethiopian economy. This emerging transport network is fundamental to the long-term
viability of Chinese investments in the Djibouti ports and free trade zone. These include rail, road,
and pipeline networks extending westward to Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, and southward to
Ethiopian oil and gas fields, principally the Ogaden Basin. Some infrastructure has been constructed
and put into operation, but much remains uncompleted.
Railroads
The Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway is the flagship component of China’s push to connect Djibouti
with the Ethiopian economy. China Railway Group (CRG) and China Civil Engineering Construction
Corporation (CCECC) built the railway connecting the Ethiopian capital to Djibouti between 2011
and 2016.99 Exim Bank furnished 70 percent of the capital for the Ethiopia segment of the line ($2.4
billion out of the total $3.4 billion). The remaining 30 percent was funded by the Ethiopian
Government. 100 Fifteen percent of the Djibouti section, costing $578 million, was funded by the
Djibouti government, with the rest financed by Chinese banks.101 The 756 km rail project officially
started commercial operations in January 2018, allowing freight transport from Djibouti’s port to the
Ethiopian capital.102 Some 90 percent of the total activity at Djibouti's ports is Ethiopian import or
export trade.103
This new railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti represents the first major project of this type
since the French built a rail line in the 1890s. It is also the first fully electrified rail on the African
continent and the first outside China to use exclusively Chinese standards.104 It will reduce the travel
time for cargo from three days for trucking to less than 10 hours, and is projected to eventually carry
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8.5 million tons of freight annually.105 CRG and CCECC inked a 6-year contract to operate the
railway in 2015, but encountered a variety of obstacles, from electricity outages to cattle collisions.
Sinosure, the central state-owned Chinese insurance firm, wrote off $1 billion in losses on the project
and Exim Bank halted funding to construct a second track.106 Nonetheless, Chinese firms anticipate
the railroad’s freight capacity will expand after Chinese firms build an additional 1,500 miles of rail
line in Ethiopia.107
Recent reports confirm that the final sections of rail connections to the Doraleh Container Terminal
and Multipurpose Port are now completed.108 Precise figures are not available regarding how much
cargo is still being trucked or conveyed by new railway. However, according to one report, the
railway was heavily used over the summer of 2019 to ship approximately 70,000 tons of fertilizer
from Djibouti’s ports to Ethiopia.109 The report indicated 75 freight trucks would have been required
to move the equivalent of a single train trip. Rapid delivery of more fertilizer is reportedly a boon to
Ethiopian farm productivity—especially cotton cultivation, which helps feed its budding textile
industry.110
Some progress has been made on connecting the new railway to the northern areas of Ethiopia. A
Chinese-built industrial park in Kombolcha, a city in Ethiopia’s northern Amhara State, will soon be
connected to the rest of Ethiopia’s national rail network and, through it, to Djibouti.111 The first phase
of the Awash-Woldiya Railway, contracted to the Turkish firm Yapi Merkezi, runs from Awash to
Kombolcha and is currently being finalized. At 97 percent completion, the line will likely be
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electrified and in operation sometime this year.112 Official reporting from the PRC Ministry of
Commerce indicates that in the north, the Mekele-Tadjourah rail line remains at the proposal stage.113
These developments are exceptions, however, and the Ethiopian logistics sector largely lags behind
projected requirements. The state-owned Ethiopian Shipping & Logistics Services Enterprise
monopolizes the multi-modal transport system from Djibouti to Ethiopian regions. The system is
inefficient and expensive, which stymies Ethiopia’s import and export sectors. According to some
studies, restrictive licensing practices have further increased shipping costs by 30-50 percent.114
Currently the main railway is only used by a few big export companies because of high rail-rates
relative to trucking and the lack of branch lines to Ethiopian depots and industrial zones.115 This
could change, as the rail line has recently completed its connection to the Doraleh Multipurpose Port
in Djibouti.116 The lack of rail service to Tadjourah port further limits Ethiopia’s development.117
Highways
While the growing rail capacity will eventually supplant some trucking, there remains high demand
for roads connecting Djibouti’s ports to inland markets. Road construction, however, lags even rail
development. Some Ethiopian analysts suggest this is purposeful to encourage increased use of the
rail line, allowing Ethiopian railways to reduce debt incurred by such rapid expansion.118
The primary roadway connecting Djibouti to Ethiopia is Djibouti’s route nationale (RN-1), which
runs from the capital to Galafi, through Awash, and on to Addis Ababa. Approximately 1,000 trucks
move along the road per day, carrying mostly fuel and other liquid bulk.119 Some sections of this road
are so severely degraded the actual paved roads are untraversable and trucks are forced to create
bypasses across stretches of the desert.120 China’s Exim Bank provided financing for Ethiopia’s first
modern highway from Addis Ababa to Adama, which in 2014 linked the capital to Mojo dry port,
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one of the areas where Chinese companies have constructed an industrial park.121 Other Chinese-led
road projects are also organized around industrial parks in the region. Running from Mojo dry port
southeast of Addis Ababa to the flagship industrial park in Hawassa, the Hawassa Expressway is set
to be completed in late 2020.122 China’s Exim Bank is financing the fourth phase of this project,
which will be built between Negele and Hawassa.123 Increased traffic from industrial development is
creating demand for improved routes, which could lead to enhanced trucking capacity to the rest of
Ethiopia and Djibouti’s ports.
Pipelines
Running parallel to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway is a Chinese-financed water pipeline, another
infrastructure project vital to allowing the “Shekou Model” to take root in arid Djibouti. Since June
2017, the water pipeline has transported groundwater pumped from wells in Ethiopia to Djibouti’s
key towns of Ali-Sabieh, Dikhil, Arta and the capital, Djibouti, some 320 km away.124 Djibouti’s
ability to develop into an industrial and trading hub requires a stable and sufficient water source to
support a growing population and sustain economic activity, even in periods of drought. Once fully
operational, the pipeline should provide 100,000 m3 of water per day.125 Some 95 percent of the
capital for the $340 million project was provided through concessional Exim Bank loans with a
seven-year grace period and a 2 percent interest rate.126
A key aspect of China’s strategic and commercial interest in the Horn of Africa is the potential for oil
and gas development in the Ogaden Basin, located in southeastern Ethiopia along its undefined
border with Somalia. Chinese energy developer Poly-GCL signed an agreement with the Djibouti
Government in 2013 to invest $4 billion to build a natural gas pipeline and additional port and other
facilities for gas exports. If the pipeline is completed, Ethiopian natural gas would travel from the
Ogaden Basin to the port of Damerjog, southeast of the Djiboutian capital (see Image 2, above).127
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There is currently no indication construction of the pipeline has begun despite official Ethiopian
projections that production would start in 2020.128
Despite some obstacles, China’s investment and construction have driven major improvement to
Djibouti’s infrastructure and its logistical capacity to support the development of the regional
economies of the Horn of Africa. According to the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI)
for international trade, Djibouti shot up in the world rankings from 134th in 2014, to 90th in 2018.129
However, the long-term utility of this improved transport connectivity will depend on the strength of
inland markets and resources.

Inland Markets and Resources
Chinese investments in port and intermodal infrastructure in Djibouti are premised on the theory that
the inland markets and resources of eastern Africa will make the projects economically viable.
Djibouti itself has a GDP of only $2.96 billion (in current USD), albeit growing at 5.5 percent as of
2018.130 The small nation has an estimated population of slightly less than a million people, some 75
percent of whom live in the capital.131 Services compose 76.1 percent of Djibouti’s GDP, most of
which can be attributed to freight forwarding to and from the country’s ports.132 It has little to offer
world markets other than its strategic location and its capacity to connect to other, more substantial,
economies in the region.
Demographics
Without other economies in tow, it would be untenable to tether major economic investment to such
a slender demographic profile. However, the Horn of Africa contains almost 130 million people, with
over half the population of each nation under the age of 24 years.133 As Horn of Africa economies go,
Ethiopia is the main prize. It has a much larger population base (nearly 110 million, second after
Nigeria on the continent) that is growing at nearly three percent a year (11th fastest in the world).134
Over 80 percent of that large and growing population lives in rural areas and some 65 percent of the
population is 24 years old or younger.135 According to the IMF, Ethiopia’s GDP in 2018 was $85.36
billion. It grew at nine percent in 2018/2019, making it the fastest growing economy in the region.136
Despite very low per capita income ($790), it is expected to sustain high growth rates into the
2020s.137 From the Chinese perspective, conditions are ripe in Ethiopia for the kind of economic
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development enjoyed in the PRC during its reform and opening period. Some Chinese analysts
consider it “China in Africa” and believe the Chinese model is uniquely suited to its demographic
and economic conditions.138
China’s investments in Djibouti will likely succeed or fail on the strength of Ethiopia’s markets and
resources. Given that Ethiopia, as a land-locked state, relies on Djibouti’s infrastructure for its own
prosperity, this bet may pay off over time. The PRC Ministry of Commerce reported that “Africa’s
young population, low labor costs, coupled with low raw material and energy costs, as well as tariff
preferences given to African countries by the European Union and the United States” make Ethiopia
in particular “one of the most promising destinations” for Chinese capital.139
Reflecting its own vested interest in this, Ethiopia agreed in 2018 to take a stake in the Port of
Djibouti after Djibouti terminated the DPWorld contract.140 Recognizing its over-reliance on
Djiboutian ports, Ethiopia is seeking to diversify its access to global markets, and recently undertook
investments in other regional ports to expand its avenues of access to ocean transport. One such port
is DPWorld-run Berbera in Somaliland, where Ethiopia took a 19 percent stake in a 30-year
concession and also secured rights to develop a Berbera Corridor of links to Ethiopian markets.141
After reaching a peace deal in July 2018 with neighboring Eritrea, Ethiopia also began actively
seeking to develop road and rail infrastructure and potentially port facilities in its northeastern
neighbor to export potash.142
Hydrocarbons
China invests in a range of high-profile projects in Ethiopia, including a signature effort to develop
and connect the Ogaden’s Calub and Hilala gas fields in Southeast Ethiopia to liquid natural gas
(LNG) facilities in the Port of Djibouti. China’s Poly-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Ltd. began
developing these fields after it signed a production sharing agreement with Ethiopia in 2013. It
drilled its first appraisal well in the Calub field in September 2015, and produced the first barrel of
oil in June 2018.143 To date, no investors have attempted to export the Ogaden’s oil and gas
resources.144 However, in November 2017 China’s POLY-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Ltd.
signed a $4 billion memorandum of understanding to build a natural gas pipeline, liquefaction plant,
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and export terminal in Damerjog, Djibouti.145 The pipeline is projected to transport 12 billion cubic
meters of natural gas a year from Ethiopia to Djibouti, of which 10 million cubic meters is expected
to be exported to China.146
China is not a stranger to this hydrocarbon-producing region of Ethiopia. In 2007, workers from
Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau working in an oil field in the Ogaden region came under
attack by 200 armed Somali separatists from the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Nine Chinese
nationals and 65 Ethiopian employees were killed and another seven Chinese workers were abducted
and later recovered by the Ethiopian Government.147 The Ogaden is home to ethnic Somalis and the
border in the region remains disputed between Somalia and Ethiopia. Despite previous conflict in the
area,148 peace deals were signed between the Ethiopian Government and local separatists in 2010149
and again in October 2018.150 If the more recent deal holds, stability in the Ogaden would bode well
for Chinese energy development there.
Industrial Parks
Chinese investors have launched a number of industrial parks throughout Ethiopia to leverage new
logistical capabilities as infrastructure development emerges. The resources and labor are abundant,
but “what Africa lacks is precisely the supporting infrastructure and industrial parks,” according to a
PRC Ministry of Commerce report.151 Echoing China’s “Shekou Model,” talk of an “Ethiopia
Model” swirls in Chinese business reporting. The plan entails “national investment, Chinese
construction, [Chinese] management for three years, and promoting this across all of Ethiopia,”
according to Ethiopia Industrial Parks Development Corporation President Sisay Gemechu.152
The flagship model industrial park is at Hawassah, and it focuses on the textile and apparel
industries. Completed by the CCECC in July 2016, it is operated on a three-year lease by the PRC
firm Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone, during which time it is training
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Ethiopian managers.153 Chinese investment in Hawassah and other industrial parks is motivated by
the availability of resources close to the industrial plant. As one manufacturer put it,
Chinese textile companies are moving closer to their raw material base, the cotton producing
countries such as Ethiopia. This is part of its value chain repositioning, a strategy most
Chinese companies are adopting. Companies are also using Africa as a gateway to emerging
markets on the continent and to the European market.154
Investment in the industrial parks is not limited to Chinese firms, and the logic of locating production
facilities near the source of essential resources is not lost on others in the manufacturing industry.
PVH Corp, owner of the Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein brands, moved some of its clothing
manufacturing to Hawassah in 2016.155 By 2017, at least 16 companies produced clothing at
Hawassah. One such company, Hydra Mani, reportedly was exporting $1 million of product a
month.156 Indeed, Ethiopia explicitly markets its industrial parks as an integrated solution “aimed at
coordinated production along value chains,” by virtue of their locations “along key economic
corridors” and connection to ports.157
Ethiopia is also a highly valued location for major truck manufacturing companies, including the
Africa branch of state-owned China National Heavy Duty Truck Group Co., Ltd. (Sinotruk). Its
representative explained in 2017 that “Ethiopia is a strategic market for Sinotruk.” The company
jointly runs an assembly plant in Addis Ababa with the Ethiopian manufacturing company N.A Metal
Industry & Engineering Co, which Sinotruk touts as “an example of China-Africa production
capacity cooperation.”158
Ethiopia seeks to diversify its exports beyond textiles, currently its principal export. CCECC won a
$125 million bid in May 2016 to assist this effort by constructing Adama Industrial Park focused on
manufacturing heavy machinery.159 After Hunan provincial officials announced a joint venture with
Ethiopia during the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum, this became the first industrial park developed
by a PRC provincial government.160 With government support in place, Sany Group and other
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Chinese manufacturers quickly signed MOUs to produce construction machinery, wind energy
equipment, automobile parts, and other equipment there.161
Chinese promoters now pair the “Shekou Model” and the “Ethiopia Model” as a composite
“Ethiopia-Djibouti Model” for regional development. This model, of course, relies largely on
Chinese labor, capital, and expertise. According to the Deputy Director of the China Enterprise
Reform and Development Society (a body under the State Council's State-Owned Assets Supervision
and Administration that supervises central SOEs), the model envisions increasing roles for Chinese
enterprises in financing, design, construction, equipment and materials, and operational
management.162 Ultimately, the purpose of this Ethiopia-Djibouti model is to form new international
production chains to redistribute production capacity globally for the future transformation of the
Chinese economy.163

Image 4. The “Ethiopia-Djibouti Model”164
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Finance
Securing financing from China remains the first and most urgent priority if these projects are to be
viable. Several Chinese banks have made concerted efforts to make capital available to firms
working in far-flung locations.165 One example is the Silk Road International Bank, established in
Djibouti in November 2016.166 This bank is a joint venture with the Djibouti Ministry of Finance,
which funded 25 percent of the endeavor, and two Chinese companies—the IZP Group, which
provided 25 percent of the funding, and the Silk Road E-Merchants Group, which provided 20
percent. It represents the first instance in which a Chinese commercial bank has obtained a banking
license in Africa. 167 According to the Vice-Chairman of the Silk Road International Bank, the new
venture “will provide a package of financial solutions for China-Africa bilateral trade and the
investment of China in Africa, [and] provide safe and convenient payment and settlement service for
numerous Chinese enterprises in Africa.”168 The bank provides commercial and retail banking
services to facilitate cross-border payments and enable Chinese firms to transact locally for much of
their business operation in Africa.169
The Silk Road International Bank also apparently performs a number of core functions for the
government of Djibouti. The Chinese State Council Information Office reported that the bank “will
primarily provide services for the Government of Djibouti’s revenue and expenditures, such as
handl[ing] civil servant wage distribution, pension payments, and business taxes. It will also serve as
the main bank for trade settlement and capital transactions for local Chinese enterprises.”170 In effect,
this bank, which is substantially controlled by Chinese entities, has taken over several of Djibouti’s
treasury functions. There are plans to expand these financial services across the continent. One
Chinese official stated the PRC is considering whether to establish a second African branch of the
Silk Road International Bank in Togo.171
Chinese and African banks enjoy access to a variety of funding sources for their work on the
continent. China has two funds for development in Africa: the China-Africa Development Fund,
established 2006, and the China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund, announced by Xi
Jinping during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg in December
2015.172 The new Fund was officially registered in January 2016, when $10 billion was made
available for investment in African manufacturing, high-tech goods, energy, mining, infrastructure,
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and finance. It enjoys the backing of the Exim Bank’s foreign exchange reserves and Xi Jinping’s
imprimatur as a BRI-facilitating venture,173 which enabled the Fund to participate in a $60 billion aid
package that specifically targeted the African market between 2016 and 2019.174
Such initiatives give Chinese firms increased access to African markets and resources beyond the
Djibouti-Ethiopia corridor. Continent-wide PRC efforts to court African leaders and businesses are
ongoing. One such example is the construction of the African Union Headquarters building in Addis
Ababa in 2012. This $200m project was paid for entirely by the PRC government and was
inaugurated by the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Jia
Qinglin.175 The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, also spoke in June 2017 to African
Union leaders to laud China’s successes in east Africa and market them to other African states.
China’s growing influence on the continent allowed Wang Yi’s pitch to extend beyond purely
economic matters, touching on security cooperation and PRC military aid to African Union
nations.176 These military overtures mark a new direction in Chinese foreign policy, manifested most
concretely in China’s military presence in Djibouti.

Naval and Military Component
Djibouti’s position astride major SLOCs at a critical chokepoint for global trade endows it with
considerable strategic importance. Its proximity to ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the
presence of American, Japanese and European military forces on which the Chinese would like to
keep tabs provide additional purposes for the PLA’s presence. Still, China’s decision to establish an
overseas military facility in Djibouti marks a decisive break with many decades of vehement official
disavowal that China would take this path.177 China’s former reluctance to establish an overseas
military base reflected its broader foreign policy orientation, well-summarized in Deng Xiaoping’s
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admonition to keep a low profile and focus on developing China’s economy, since China largely
enjoys a secure international environment.178 The base in Djibouti represents a stark break from
Deng’s policy line.
The functions and missions of the base are becoming clearer as it develops. PRC officials insist the
facility is intended as a resupply base for the PLAN “anti-piracy task force” deployment to the Gulf
of Aden and is not intended for further projection of military power.179 However, official PRC media
has also reported,
The base will ensure China’s performance of [additional] missions, such as escorting, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and west Asia…. will also be conducive to overseas
tasks including military cooperation, joint exercises, evacuating and protecting overseas
Chinese and emergency rescue, as well as jointly maintaining security of international
strategic seaways.180
Perhaps gradually unveiling the full extent of the base’s role lessens the immediate impact of the
strategic shift, but as then-PLAN commander ADM Wu Shengli stated in 2016 the base will clearly
enable China’s military to “carry out larger-scale missions in broader areas.”181
Observations of China’s recent operations in Djibouti (see below) further underscore the base’s
mission creep. The base marks a significant step toward a more global PLAN. At a minimum, these
facilities will help the PRC provide security and emergency evacuation for Chinese nationals
working in Africa and the large volume of Chinese investment on the continent provides powerful
justification for positioning some security capacity in proximity to these expensive projects. This
section examines the development, characteristics, and current utilization of the Djibouti base.
Base Development
The first reports of a PLA base in Djibouti emerged in 2013, when the PLA National Defense
University drafted a study for the Central Military Commission promoting the idea.182 Xi Jinping
approved the report and by February 2014 then-PRC Minister of Defense, Chang Wanquan, visited
Djibouti to sign a “Security and Defense Partnership Agreement.” The agreement allowed PLA
access to Djibouti and offered Chinese support for the Djibouti armed forces. In November 2015, a
high-level military delegation led by the Central Military Commission Chief of Staff General Fang
Fenghui and PLAN Chief of Staff Admiral Qiu Yanpeng met with Djibouti President Guelleh to
finalize details for the base.183 Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf explained that
China was given a 10-year lease at $20 million per year, with an option for another 10-year
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extension. Youssouf emphasized that “the terms of the contract and agreement are very clear and
they are the same for each and every country that requested military presence in Djibouti.” 184
There is very little Chinese or other open source reporting on the specific terms of the basing deal
between China and Djibouti. A lecturer at the PLA’s Space Engineering University described the
status of forces agreement as follows:
According to the “China-Djibouti Status of Forces Agreement,” the troops stationed in
Djibouti enjoy a series of privileges, exemptions, and conveniences. These privileges,
exemptions, and conveniences are concrete manifestations of state immunity, including:
inviolability of personal safety; inviolability of the camp, facilities, equipment, and property;
jurisdictional immunities; convenience in the areas of exit and entry [of the country],
taxation, customs, health, and quarantine; freedom of movement, freedom of communication,
and freedom of travel.185
There are still too few details to accurately appraise whether the terms of the China-Djibouti deal are
indeed similar to those of other countries, as Youssouf claims. At minimum, the disclosed details
guarantee the basic operations of the base, including personnel movement, radio frequency usage,
and the flow of supplies.
Construction began in February 2016, and by July 11, 2017 the facility was formally opened with
substantial fanfare in the PRC press.186 Foreign commentators have long referred to it as a “naval
base”—and its inauguration was indeed led by two PLAN senior captains, base commander Liang
Yang and political commissar Li Chunpeng.187 The first PLAN vessels to visit the base in Djibouti
were the Type-071 amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan and the mobile landing platform
Donghaidao, which delivered the first troops and personnel to be stationed there.188
Capabilities
From the first delivery of troops, China has augmented its security presence very gradually, thereby
muting potential alarm concerning its change in posture. Now that the base is operating, some limited
assessments of its capabilities and purposes are possible. First, its position southwest and adjacent to
the Doraleh Multipurpose Port (see Image 5 below) gives the base a potentially larger capacity, as
commercial berths could be made available for all but the largest PLAN vessels. Even excluding
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these potential dual-use facilities, the military base alone is capable of supporting a wide range of
PLA operations well beyond logistical support.

Image 5. Doraleh Multipurpose Port and PLA Support Base (December 10, 2018)

Open-source satellite imagery shows facilities for fuel, weapons, and equipment storage and various
maintenance facilities for ships and aircraft.189 There is no dry dock, floating or fixed, visible at the
facility, but there are locations to the south of the main pier available for such a facility. As noted
above, its proximity to the expansive yards at the Doraleh Multipurpose Port provides for significant
augmentation of base operations. Some estimates suggest as many as 10,000 personnel could be
stationed on the base.190 At 4,000 personnel, the U.S. military presence is currently the largest of the
seven nations with military facilities hosted by Djibouti.191
Open-source descriptions of the base’s facilities are trickling in over time. The October 2017 issue of
Naval & Merchant Ships, a Chinese publication, included a graphic of the base that marked, among
other structures, an armory, equipment support area, subterranean entrance, barracks, heliport, oil
depot, reinforced bunker, and pier (see Image 6 below).192 Official sources confirm an organic PLAN
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petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) transport detachment is deployed on base, likely to carry out
future refueling operations.193 Analysis of satellite imagery found “at least 10 storage barracks, [an]
ammunition point, [an] office complex and a heliport.” The report also noted two entrances to the
base (one connecting to the main road and another connecting to the container terminal) and four
layers of defensive works.194 The heliport includes several hangars and a 400-meter (approx. 1,312
foot) runway with air traffic control.195 Thus far, no aircraft have been reported deployed to the
installation, nor could combat or transport aircraft use this short runway.

Image 6. Naval & Merchant Ships depiction of activities at Djibouti Support Base

Construction of a dedicated naval pier is a key development in the base’s ability to support PLAN
operations. In May 2018, China began rapid construction of a 330-meter long (nearly 1,100 foot)
pier, which is now largely complete.196 When asked whether the pier could accommodate a Chinese
aircraft carrier, China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian did not deny the possibility, stating,
“the relevant facilities are progressing as planned. The construction of this facility is for China to
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better carry out escorts in Somali waters in the Gulf of Aden and humanitarian rescue missions.” 197
Draught considerations are likely the biggest constraint on the types of ships that could berth at the
Chinese base. Nonetheless, with a total of 660-meters (2,165 feet) of berthing, the pier has significant
space for the PLAN’s surface combatants, especially if similar types nest alongside each other. Water
depth is not an issue at the nearby Doraleh Multipurpose Port, at least. Its 50-foot depth was
sufficient to moor a Type-071 LPD there in July 2018.198
Station security is provided by a battalion-grade PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) unit that first
deployed from Zhanjiang on July 11, 2017.199 Initially led by Major Jiang Zhichao, the battalion
comprises three mechanized infantry companies, based on a battalion-wide field march exercise in
January 2018. During the exercise, one third of the battalion sortied each day, rather than en masse.
Video footage of the exercise shows company-sized infantry units marching in the field.200 These
infantry companies are reinforced by an unknown number of wheeled combat vehicles, including at
least eight ZBL-08 infantry fighting vehicles and two ZTL-11 assault vehicles.201
Such displays offer some idea of the combat strength present at the Djibouti Support Base. Chinese
media coverage of the 2019 Lunar New Year greeting showed approximately 180 standing
personnel, two ZTL-11 assault vehicles, four ZBL-08 infantry fighting vehicles, and two Mengshi
light vehicles.202 This likely reflects the battalion command staff and one mechanized infantry
company, although it is unclear whether each company is supported by the same number of combat
vehicles. Other support elements, such as artillery batteries or aviation units, have not been observed
at the Djibouti installation. The addition of PLAN or PLANMC rotary wing aircraft would greatly
enhance the battalion’s mobility and range.
Recent reports also indicate the presence of a PLANMC special forces detachment on base. Base
commander Senior Captain Liang Yang oversaw related counterterrorism and law enforcement
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training for Djiboutian Coast Guard personnel in early February 2020. Members of the PLANMC
special forces detachment conducted training exercises such as boarding, anti-piracy, and hostage
rescue using rigid-hull inflatable craft equipped with 12.7mm Type-89 heavy machine guns.203

Image 7. Djibouti base opening ceremony204

Combat training involving the PLANMC began less than two months after the base’s opening. This
training appears geared toward conditioning the troops for operations in Djibouti’s harsh desert
conditions. Appendix A details all reported combat training events. These exercises provide some
insight into the combat capabilities and levels of readiness of the PLANMC troops defending the
base. In large part, tactical weapons training is focused on small unit rapid response against threats to
PRC personnel in Djibouti and the base itself. Satellite imagery suggests there is an urban-warfare
training facility in the southeastern corner of the base, perhaps for this purpose. However, there has
been no specific mention in open source Chinese-language materials of any role for this unit to
conduct such missions within the region.
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Functions and Missions
Since 2015, the PLAN has been tasked not only with “near seas defense,” its limited historical role,
but also the more expansive mission of “far seas protection.”205 This entails securing strategic
SLOCS, protecting citizens and investments overseas, and conducting military diplomacy.206 The
anti-piracy mission preceded this doctrinal shift and has now given way to a range of actual and
potential roles for the PLAN units operating outside of China’s immediate backyard. Non-combatant
evacuation operations are plainly a priority, after the hard lessons of evacuating 35,000 Chinese
nationals from war-torn Libya in 2011.207 Another smaller-scale operation involving three PLAN
ships evacuated PRC (and other) citizens from Yemen to Djibouti in 2015.208 Djibouti is ideally
positioned to support PLAN operations in those hot spots.
Logistics Support for the PLAN
Supporting anti-piracy escort task forces was a major justification to construct the Djibouti Support
Base. The PLAN has relied heavily on the port of Djibouti for quite some time. Beginning with the
4th Escort Task Force’s port-call in January 2010, every escort task force to date has stopped in
Djibouti for replenishment (补给), rest, rehabilitation and training (休整), inspection and
maintenance (检修), and other diplomatic, goodwill, and cultural activities (see Appendix B).209
PLAN ships almost always moor in Djibouti’s old port area where they are greeted by PRC embassy
staff and nationals brought to welcome each ship. Since construction of the base, senior officers and
personnel from the installation have also been on hand to greet each ship entering the port.
The PLAN spends a significant amount of time in Djibouti. Escort task forces, comprised of two
surface combatants and a replenishment ship, conduct their in-port rest and replenishment in rounds.
The vessels in each three-ship task force typically take turns entering port, while the remaining two
continue performing escort missions. Since ships most often remain pier-side for five days, this
means a PLAN ship will be in Djibouti for much of the month when each task force visits.210 Some
task forces visit twice during their deployments.211 This time adds up. According to senior leaders in
the PLAN Logistics Department, the cycle time for rest and replenishment of escort task forces in
Djibouti will be greatly shortened as conditions mature, particularly conditions at the support base.
Improvements in berthing, material supply, medical support, and repairs will also reduce reliance on
in-theater replenishment ships.212

PRC, State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, May 2015), p.
13.
206
Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21 st Century (Suitland, MD: Office
of Naval Intelligence, 2015), pp. 7-11.
207
“35,860 Chinese nationals in Libya evacuated: FM,” China Daily, March 3, 2011,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-03/03/content_12105999.htm.
208
“Spotlight: China completes evacuation from Yemen, assisting 629 nationals, 279 foreigners,” Xinhua, April 7, 2015,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/07/c_134130679.htm.
209
中国海军护航编队 ‘马鞍山’ 号抵达吉布提港进行补给休整 [“‘Ma’Anshan’ of the Chinese Navy Escort Task Force
Arrives in Djibouti Port for Replenishment and Rest”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 25, 2010,
http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t653660.htm.
210
Escort task forces usually include destroyers, frigates, and Type-903 or Type-901 replenishment ships, although Type071 landing platforms docks have also taken part in a few anti-piracy deployments. See Appendix A.
211
Some escort task forces make multiple stops in Djibouti during their deployment. For example, ships of the 13 th,19th,
nd
22 , 23rd, and 30th escort task forces called on Djibouti twice. See Appendix B.
212
刘文平, 王铁刚 [Liu Wenping, Wang Tiegang], 后勤保障: 伴随战舰挺进深蓝 [“Logistics Support: Going to the
Deep Blue Alongside Warships”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], April 15, 2019, p. 4.
205

34

The Djibouti base can also facilitate longer duration deployments of PLAN escort task forces in
theater. PLAN escort forces spend up to 40 percent of their three-month deployment cycles underway
across 6,000-7,000 nautical miles to reach the Gulf of Aden, requiring their destroyers and frigates to
replenish twice on route.213 Although experience and training in underway replenishment was sorely
needed when escort operations began in 2008, after more than ten years the PLAN has matured
enough that it now seeks to optimize its far-seas escort operations. At least one Chinese analyst
believes Djibouti could serve as a shore leave location, allowing deployment times to the Gulf of
Aden to be extended by about 20 percent.214 The base has medical facilities, dormitories and athletic
facilities that could provide improved rest and relief for naval personnel.215 While Djibouti’s
inhospitable climate is not an ideal place for shore leave, base facilities may compare favorably to
life aboard smaller surface combatants. A PLAN medical survey conducted on the 4th Escort Task
Force reported high numbers of sailors suffering from mild to moderate depression despite measures
taken to alleviate such effects, such as short-term shore leave.216 The need to sustain morale could
explain the relatively frequent stops in Djibouti by PLAN frigates, since task forces include
replenishment ships that should satisfy replenishment requirements and keep combat ships on station.
Security is a big concern for PLAN forces when in port. Personnel on shore leave must undergo
security and diplomatic briefings, and staff must carefully plan leave events ahead of time.217 Chinese
reports also indicate concern over ship security when in close proximity to other international navies
at the Djibouti old port. In December 2016, the 25th Escort Task Force reported sighting divers
approaching a PLAN ship in port, accusing a Japanese naval ship moored nearby.218 The Djibouti
Support Base provides a far more secure environment for PLAN forces operating in theater. A longterm lease on the facility permits construction of underground or otherwise hardened facilities that
better protect military personnel and assets. Once the naval pier becomes operational, fueling,
replenishment, and shore leave will become even more secure.
PLAN medical, logistics, and equipment support staff stationed on base began providing support to
task forces immediately after opening in August 2017, starting with the 27th anti-piracy Escort Task
Force’s stopover in Djibouti. Over the next year, it provided support and repair services involving
nearly 1,000 parts to four escort task forces. 219 This underscores the ability of the base facilities to
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store prepositioned key materials to supply PLAN forces operating in the region, such as armaments,
equipment, and logistics materials needed for timely support for far-seas operations.220 In addition to
naval forces, the base is well-positioned to support China’s large peacekeeping forces on the African
continent (some 2,021, with 1,390 in east Africa), though no such support has been reported in open
sources.221
Intelligence Collection
Protecting China’s overseas interests will require the PLA to anticipate and rapidly respond to
emerging crises. There is little open discussion on this subject due to the sensitivity of intelligence
matters, but the base will naturally facilitate early warning and intelligence gathering activities. PLA
analysts note that intelligence collection is an important role for strategic strongpoints,222 and others
cite the U.S. military’s facility at Diego Garcia is as a useful model.223 The base’s location in
Djibouti is conducive to collect intelligence on other international military activities in Djibouti—
most significantly, U.S. AFRICOM’s Camp Lemonnier, the main hub for U.S. military operations in
Africa. But the base’s position on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait provides perhaps its most important
intelligence function—a favorable vantage to observe military and commercial traffic through this
important global chokepoint.
HA/DR and Military Diplomacy
The PLA has also highlighted the base’s ability to support regional humanitarian assistance and
disaster response operations. Similarly, military diplomacy is quite visible in Djibouti. Prior to the
construction of the base, PLAN escort task forces made a number of goodwill visits to local
Djiboutian communities.224 The PLAN hospital ship Peace Ark visited Djibouti in 2010 and 2017,
offering free medical care to local residents in order to foster political goodwill with Djibouti’s
leadership and socialize the PLA’s in-country presence.225 Shortly after its opening, the base
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provided medical materials to the Djiboutian Military Police. PLA sources have indicated that the
base hospital will also provide medical services to the local Djiboutian people.226 In this capacity, the
base launched “Bright Mission” in cooperation with Djiboutian health authorities in December 2019
to provide cataract surgery to local citizens. The PLAN Second Military Medical University in
Shanghai dispatched ten personnel to support this effort.227 The Chinese base also responded to a
Djiboutian request to assist in a multinational effort to extinguish fires that broke out in Djibouti
City’s landfill.228
The base hospital provides opportunities for international military engagement. PLAN forces in
Djibouti conducted their first joint exercise with a foreign military on April 25, 2018, when base
personnel teamed up with Italian forces to conduct medical rescue exercises.229 They performed two
more medical evacuation training exercises with the European Naval Forces in the Gulf of Aden in
2018. The first involved responding to a merchant ship distress call and dispatching a team aboard an
Italian frigate in Task Force 465. After rendering assistance, the exercise team returned to base on the
frigate’s SH-90 helicopter with a patient in severe condition.230 In a second joint exercise, a Spanish
amphibious ship focused on disaster relief, again dispatching medical personnel and coordinating
foreign helicopter transport to the base’s medical facilities.231
These “soft” functions continue the gradual socialization of China’s military presence in Djibouti,
paving the way for incremental expansion over the coming years. Senior Chinese diplomats have
already suggested, for instance, that Chinese troops could mediate border conflicts in the region.232
While visiting Ethiopia in 2016, a high-level PLA delegation hinted at the military’s potential use of
the vast PRC-built civilian infrastructure networks connecting the two African nations.233
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In sum, the PRC’s base in Djibouti and growing military engagement in the wider region represent an
important change in the PLA’s overseas posture. Given China’s economic commitment to the Horn
of Africa, its growing political and military connections to Djibouti and Ethiopia, and the
demonstrated capacity to quickly scale up port facilities, PLA exercises, trainings, and deployments
in the region will likely increase significantly over time.

Conclusion
China’s growing engagement in Djibouti is a combined commercial and military undertaking to
establish a strategic position for China in the western Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. China’s
comprehensive approach to first developing a commercial transport and logistics hub is characteristic
of the strategic strongpoint model. Party-state priorities to access emerging markets and protect vital
state and civilian interests in the region drive this process forward.
Chinese firms have so far provided a robust platform for a wide-ranging PRC diplomatic, economic,
and strategic presence in Djibouti, wrapped in the narrative promise of future local wealth through
the “Shekou Model.” The consolidation of China’s strategic position in the western Indian Ocean and
east Africa depends on complementary efforts to construct and operate road, rail, and pipeline
infrastructure to connect inland markets and resources to the greater maritime economy. China
appears to be counting on the success of its economic development efforts in the region to translate
into a long-term military presence, with the strategic influence that comes with it. But how successful
have these efforts been to date?
Commercially, despite optimistic projections, China’s investments in Djibouti and Ethiopia have not
lived up to the hype as yet. The changing political environment in Ethiopia, its diversification away
from sole reliance on Djibouti’s ports, and a weakened global economy all serve as headwinds to
making Djibouti and the greater Horn of Africa a successful example of the “Shekou Model.” That
said, if the PRC is able to patiently play the long game, its commercial investments in this region
with many promising attributes may well pay off over time. Further, China’s early investments give
it an advantage over latecomers who will find themselves having to adjust to Chinese standards,
practices, and influence already embedded in the region.
Politically, China has developed a close relationship with the Djiboutian government, to the extent
that Chinese entities are involved in government-like functions through the CMPort joint venture
with the Djibouti port authority, and the treasury-like role of the Silk Road Investment Bank. This
augments already-close PRC relations with the Guelleh family that sits at the top of Djibouti’s
political structure. Through its naval diplomacy and other public relations measures, China seeks to
portray itself as a positive force for the people of Djibouti, but it has clearly aimed its most important
efforts at maximizing access to existing political power.
Militarily, the completion of the strategic strongpoint with the construction of the naval base further
augments Chinese power in Djibouti and in this strategically important part of the world. In China’s
model, the military follows its economic investment. The base is becoming a useful asset for
intelligence collection, regional power projection, and to sustain the PLA’s growing regional
presence.234 The new base also marks a strategic shift in PLAN support methods for far-seas fleet
Chen Dong. See: 范长龙访问埃塞俄比亚 [“Fan Changlong Visits Ethiopia”], 新华社 [Xinhua], November 23, 2016,
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https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-303.pdf
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operations. The Djibouti Support Base political commissar explains the shift in these terms: “support
methods for China’s far-seas escorts are gradually adjusting away from a focus on accompanying
replenishment ships supplemented by mooring in foreign ports, into a new model focused on
overseas base support supplemented by other ports abroad and domestic support.”235 Those overseas
bases and “other ports abroad” are of critical importance to analysis of China’s growing military
presence abroad.
After all, this first strategic strongpoint is not designed to stand alone. By itself, the base is
undefendable during conflict with another major power. From the PLA’s perspective, the lone base
in Djibouti cannot be the only PLA safe harbor west of Fiery Cross Reef. More strategic strongpoints
will need to be established to support China’s out of area operations. This suggests China will be
looking to develop additional, mutually supporting strategic strongpoints that better connect the base
in Djibouti to the bases in the Spratly Islands. Djibouti’s strategic value emerges as part of a network
of strategic strongpoints spanning the Indian Ocean to support expanded Chinese trade and
investment and to enable the PLA to better protect China’s growing portfolio of “overseas interests.”
Looking ahead, the formal military base at Djibouti is probably not the model for how other Chinese
strategic strongpoints will develop. The unique national status of Djibouti as host of several foreign
militaries (most significantly, Japan) and the site of a multinational anti-piracy effort made the
opportunity to set up a military base there an unusual opportunity. The remainder of the case studies
in this series will examine other ports that fit the strategic strongpoint model and may form the
backbone of the PLA’s expeditionary operations in the coming decades as China seeks expanding
influence across the Indian Ocean region.

“Djibouti Base Political Commissar: Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces Will Shift Over to Support Primarily from
Overseas Bases,” December 27, 2018.
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Appendix A. PLA Combat Training in Djibouti (2017-2018)
Date

Details of Combat Training

22 Sep. 2017

First reported use of Djibouti’s national ranges. Dozens of troops aboard ZBL-08s traveled to
the National Gendarmerie Training Range. Exercises included use of various small arms and
vehicle mounted weapons.

5 Nov. 2017

Series of exercises at an unknown location to mark the 19th National People’s Congress
report. Involved combat realistic hostage rescue and live-fire exercises, as well as training in
combat readiness patrols in full gear and emergency mobilization.

23 Nov. 2017

Live-fire exercise with heavy weapons (two ZTL-11s and three ZBL-08s) at the Arta firing
range. Combined assault maneuvers meant to test tactics and emergency response
capabilities. Troops practiced with assault rifles, crew-served machine guns, sniper rifles, and
vehicle-mounted weapons.

9 Jan. 2018

Base organized an “all personnel tactical field march in full gear” to train the troops in
conducting missions in volcanic desert conditions. Over the course of three days, three
groups of personnel marched 15 km in full gear across uninhabited areas of the desert,
encountering blue force harassment and overcoming challenges in combat, countering enemy
surveillance aircraft, and pursuing terrorist threats on foot.

12 May 2018

Live-fire training involving ZBL-08 and ZTL-11 vehicles at the Arta firing range, focused on
rapid maneuver combat and counter-terrorism response. Assault maneuvers, multi-pronged
pursuit, coordinated light and heavy fires, and precision strikes against “terrorist” targets
were conducted during this exercise. This exercise was reportedly conducted during the hot
season to test the high-intensity limits of operational command, coordinated communications,
logistics support, and equipment support. Troops deployed from the ZBL-08s also conducted
ground combat tactical maneuvers.

7 Jul. 2018

A combat readiness exercise was conducted to test the rapid response capabilities of the
troops at the Djibouti Support Base. Troops were seen rapidly dismounting from their
Mengshi vehicle in combat gear.
PRC press ceased reporting on combat exercises in July 2018, but such exercises almost
certainly continue to present.

Appendix A Sources: 中国驻吉布提保障基地首次组织实弹射击训练 [“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti’s First Time
Organizing Live-Fire Training”], 澎拜防务 [The Paper-Defense], September 23, 2017,
http://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1803823; 张庆宝, 蔡吕良 [Zhang Qingbao, Cai Lüliang], 驻吉布提保障基地官兵 不负重托, 担好首任首责 [“Officers and Soldiers of the Support Base in Djibouti Bear Great Trust and Take on the First
Assignment with Responsibility”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 6, 2017, p. 1; Zhao Lei, Zhou Jin, “Live-fire Exercises
Conducted by PLA Base in Djibouti,” China Daily, November 25, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201711/25/content_34966883.htm; 张庆宝, 周致远 [Zhang Qingbao, Zhou Zhiyuan], 我驻吉布提保障基地组织火炮实施射击训练
[“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti Organizes Live Cannon Fire Training”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], November 28,
2017, http://www.81.cn/jmtt/2017-11/28/content_7845356.htm; 张庆宝, 檀龙龙 [Zhang Qingbao, Tan Longlong], 我驻吉布提
保障基地开展全员全装野外训练 [“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti Conducts All-Personnel Field March in Full Gear”], 人民
海军 [People’s Navy], January 15, 2018, p. 1; 张庆宝, 陈平, 张振凯 [Zhang Qingbao, Chen Ping, Zhang Zhenkai], 我驻吉布提
保障基地开展实兵实装实弹演练 [“Chinese Support Base in Djibouti Conducts Live-fire Training Exercise with Real Troops
and Equipment”], 央广网 [China National Radio], May 16, 2018, http://military.china.com.cn/201805/16/content_51336435_2.htm; “Our Support Base in Djibouti Conducts Combat Readiness Mobilization Exercises.”
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Appendix B. PLAN Port Calls to Djibouti (2010-Present)
Date

Mission

Vessel

24 January 2010

4th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054 frigate Ma’anshan

28 January 2010

4th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054 frigate Wenzhou

10 February 2010

4th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Chaohu

3 May 2010

5th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052B destroyer Guangzhou

10 May 2010

5th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Chaohu

23 August 2010

Friendly Visit

Type-920 hospital ship Heping Fangzhou

24 August 2010

6th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

13 September 2010

6th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan

20 September 2010

6th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052C destroyer Lanzhou

13 December 2010

7th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Zhoushan

20 December 2010

7th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Xuzhou

21 February 2011

7th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Zhoushan

29 March 2011

8th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu

10 May 2011

8th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054 frigate Wenzhou

15 May 2011

8th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054 frigate Ma’anshan

6 October 2011

9th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052B destroyer Wuhan

12 October 2011

9th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yulin

19 October 2011

9th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu

1 January 2012

10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yuncheng

12 January 2012

10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052C destroyer Haikou

7 March 2012

10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052C destroyer Haikou

24 March 2012

11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

11 May 2012

11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yantai

20 May 2012

Circumnavigation—Friendly Visit

Type-679 training ship Zhenghe

23 May 2012

11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

5 June 2012

11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052 destroyer Qingdao

13 August 2012

12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yiyang

19 August 2012

12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Changzhou

1 December 2012

13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Huangshan

8 December 2012

13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Hengyang

14 December 2012

13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu

31 January 2013

13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Huangshan

9 February 2013

13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Hengyang
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6 June 2013

14th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

25 July 2013

14 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin

30 July 2013

14th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-053H3 frigate Mianyang

th

th

7 October 2013

15 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-071 landing platform dock Jinggangshan

14 October 2013

15th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu

th

21 October 2013

15 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Hengshui

22 February 2014

16th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-053H3 frigate Luoyang

th

13 March 2014

16 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu

1 April 2014

16th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yancheng

th

30 June 2014

17 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052C destroyer Changchun

5 July 2014

17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Changzhou

th

10 July 2014

17 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu

30 July 2014

17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052C destroyer Changchun

th

8 September 2014

18 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-071 landing platform dock Changbaishan

13 September 2014

18th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yuncheng

th

3 November 2014

18 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-071 landing platform dock Changbaishan

26 January 2015

19th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Linyi

th

31 January 2015

19 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Weifang

13 February 2015

19th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

th

30 March 2015

19 Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/NEO

Type-054A frigate Linyi

31 March 2015

19th Anti-piracy Escort Task
Force/NEO

Type-054A frigate Weifang

1 June 2015

20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-051 destroyer Jinan

7 June 2015

20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yiyang

12 June 2015

20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu

30 June 2015

20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-051 destroyer Jinan

Mid-July 2015

20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yiyang

6 September 2015

21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Liuzhou

12 September 2015

21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Sanya

17 September 2015

21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu

8 February 2016

22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052 destroyer Qingdao

6 April 2016

22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu

12 April 2016

22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Daqing

29 April 2016

23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Zhoushan

15 May 2016

23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Xiangtan
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10 July 2016

23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force
rd

Type-054A frigate Zhoushan

16 July 2016

23 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu

3 October 2016

24th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin

th

9 October 2016

24 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Handan

15 October 2016

24th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu

th

12 January 2017

25 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Hengyang

Mid-March 2017

25th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Honghu

th

22 March 2017

25 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yulin

1 May 2017

26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Huanggang

th

7 May 2017

26 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yangzhou

13 May 2017

26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Gaoyouhu

28 June 2017

Task Force 150–Long-distance
Friendly Visit

Type-052C destroyer Changchun, Type-054A
frigate Jingzhou, Type-903A replenishment ship
Chaohu

1 August 2017

26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force
(base opening ceremony)

Unclear - personnel from 26th Anti-piracy Escort
Task Force present during base opening ceremony

23 August 2017

Harmonious Mission-2017

Type-920 hospital ship Heping Fangzhou

th

6 September 2017

27 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052C destroyer Haikou

Mid-September 2017

27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yueyang, Type-901
replenishment ship Qinghaihu

6 November 2017

27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052C destroyer Haikou

Mid-November 2017

27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yueyang, Type-901
replenishment ship Qinghaihu

8 February 2018

28th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu

19 February 2018

28th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Yancheng

th

25 February 2018

28 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Weifang

14 May 2018

29th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Xuzhou

th

20 May 2018

29 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Binzhou

26 May 2018

29th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu

th

9 September 2018

30 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Wuhu

14 September 2018

30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Handan

th

19 September 2018

30 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu

10 November 2018

30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Wuhu

th

16 November 2018

30 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Handan

26 January 2019

31st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Xuchang

st

20 February 2019

31 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Luomahu

10 March 2019

31st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan
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14 May 2019

32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force
nd

Type-052C destroyer Xi’an

22 May 2019

32 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Anyang

21 July 2019

32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Anyang

nd

26 July 2019

32 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Gaoyouhu

24 September 2019

33rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052D destroyer Xining

rd

30 September 2019

33 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-054A frigate Weifang

6 October 2019

33rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903A replenishment ship Kekexilihu

th

20 January 2020

34 Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

25 January 2020

34th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force

Type-052D destroyer Yinchuan

Appendix B Sources: “‘Ma’Anshan’ of the Chinese Navy Escort Task Force Arrives in Djibouti Port for Replenishment
and Rest;” 海军护航编队‘温州’舰抵达吉布提港 [“Naval Escort Task Force ‘Wenzhou’ Arrives in Djibouti Port”], 驻吉布提使
馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 29, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t654689.htm; The FFG Chaohu joined
the fourth escort task force earlier in late 2009. 中国海军护航编队 ‘巢湖’ 号抵达吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort
Task Force ‘Chaohu’ Arrives in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti],
February 10, 2010,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677704/1206x2_677724/t657510.shtml; 海军第五批
护航编队首次停靠非洲港口吉布提 [“Fifth Naval Escort Task Force Stops in the African Port of Djibouti for the First Time”],
新华网 [Xinhua], May 4, 2010, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2010_05/04/1482421_0.shtml; 驻吉使馆经商处积极参与海
军第五批护航编队靠港后勤保障工作 [“The Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy in Djibouti Participates in
Logistic Support Work of the Fifth Naval Escort Task Force Stop in Port”], 驻吉经商参处 [Economic and Commercial Office in
Djibouti], May 26, 2010, http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201005/20100506932117.shtml; 中国海军和平方舟医院船时隔
七年再访吉布提 [“Chinese Naval Hospital Ship Peace Ark Visits Djibouti Again After Seven Years”], 新华社 [Xinhua], August
23, 2017, http://m.xinhuanet.com/2017-08/23/c_1121531941.htm; 海军护航编队 ‘微山湖号’ 抵达吉布提港 [“Naval Escort
Task Force ‘Weishanhu’ Arrives in Djibouti Port”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], August 24, 2010,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677704/1206x2_677724/t726542.shtml; 驻吉布提大
使张国庆率使馆及中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 “昆仑山” 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing
Leads Staff from Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome Escort Task Force ‘Kunlunshan’ to Djibouti for Rest and
Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 13, 2010, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t752046.htm; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率使馆及援吉医疗队人员欢迎护航编队 ‘兰州号’ 来吉补给休整
[“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Embassy Staff and Medical Aid Team Personnel to Welcome Escort Task
Force ‘Lanzhou’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 21, 2010,
http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t754225.htm; 海军第七批护航编队舟山舰完成首次靠港休整补给 [“Seventh Naval
Escort Task Force Ship Zhoushan Completes its First Stop in Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 凤凰军事 [Phoenix News
Military], December 21, 2010, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2010_12/21/3613026_0.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率使馆
和中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 ‘舟山’ 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Staff from
Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome Escort Task Force ‘Zhoushan’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”],
驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 13, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t777810.htm; 驻吉布提大
使张国庆率使馆和中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 ‘徐州’ 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing
Leads Staff from Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome ‘Xuzhou’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉
布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 20, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t779570.htm; The Libya NEO
reportedly caused the Zhoushan to cancel leave and rest in Djibouti to take over escort operations for the Xuzhou FFG that was
diverted to support the NEO operation. See ‘徐州’舰 26 日已航行至红海北部海域为撤侨护航 [“Naval Ship ‘Xuzhou’ in the
northern area of the Red Sea on the 26th to Escort Evacuated Overseas Chinese”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government
Portal], February 26, 2011, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-02/26/content_1811338.htm; 刘一伟, 唐诗峰 [Liu Yiwei, Tang
Shifeng], “舟山”舰停靠吉布提休整补给 5 天 中资机构欢迎 [“Naval Ship ‘Zhoushan’ Stops in Djibouti for Five-Day Rest and
Replenishment, Welcomed by Chinese-funded Institutions”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 25, 2011,
http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2011_02/25/4851610_0.shtml; 海军护航编队 ‘千岛湖’ 号停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Naval
Escort Task Force ‘Qiandaohu’ Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti],
March 29, 2011, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t810533.htm; 海军第八批护航编队慰问吉小学 [“Eighth Naval Escort
Task Force Visits Djibouti Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 13, 2011, http://dj.china-
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embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t822349.htm; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我护航编队 ‘马鞍山’号再次到吉 [“PRC Ambassador to
Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Another Arrival by Chinese Escort Task Force ‘Ma’Anshan’”], 驻吉布提使馆
[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 16, 2011, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t822766.htm; 中国海军第九批护航编队 停靠
吉布提补给休整 [“Ninth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 海南频道
[Hi.Chinanews.com], October 6, 2011, http://www.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2011-10-06/178791.html; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率
队欢迎我第九批护航编队 ‘玉林号’ 到吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome
Ninth Chinese Escort Task Force ‘Yulin’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 央视网 [CCTV], October 13, 2011,
http://news.cntv.cn/20111013/117274.shtml; 驻吉布提使馆欢迎青海湖舰到吉休整补给 [“Embassy in Djibouti Welcomes
Naval Ship Qinghaihu to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国领事服务网 [CS.MFA.GOV.CN], October 24, 2011,
http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/zggmzhw/lsbh/lbxw/t870133.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆元旦率队欢迎我第十批护航编队运城舰到吉补
给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team on New Year’s Day to Welcome Tenth Chinese Escort Task
Force Ship ‘Yuncheng’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 1, 2012,
http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t892146.htm; 海军 ‘海口’舰停靠吉布提进行第二轮补给休整 [“Naval Ship ‘Haikou’
Stops in Djibouti for Second Round of Rest and Replenishment”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], January 12, 2012,
http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2012_01/13/11939836_0.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我第十批护航编队海口
舰到吉补给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Tenth Chinese Escort Task Force Ship
Haikou to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 12, 2012, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t895007.htm; 海军第十批护航编队慰问吉布提小学 [“Tenth Naval Escort Task Force Visits Djibouti
Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], March 9, 2012, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t912449.htm; 海军第十一批护航编队开始首轮靠港补给休整 [“Eleventh Naval Escort Task Force
Begins First Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], March 25, 2012,
http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_03/25/13430028_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军烟台舰到吉补给休整 [“Chinesefunded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Yantai to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆经商处 [PRC
Embassy in Djibouti Economic and Commercial Office], May 11, 2012,
http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201205/20120508119523.shtml; “郑和” 舰环球航行: 停靠吉布提补给休整 [“Naval Ship
‘Zheng He’ Circumnavigation: Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中广军事 [China National Radio Military], May
20, 2012, http://mil.cnr.cn/ztl/zhjhq/zxxx/201205/t20120520_509656458.html; 驻吉布提使馆欢迎海军第十一批护航编队微山
湖舰到吉补给休整 [“Embassy in Djibouti Welcomes Eleventh Naval Escort Task Force Ship Weishanhu to Djibouti for Rest
and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 24, 2012, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t934677.htm; 中国海军护航舰艇停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Stops
in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], June 5, 2012,
http://mil.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2012/0605/44947.shtml; 中国第 12 批护航编队 ‘益阳’舰首次靠港补给休整 [“Twelfth Chinese
Escort Task Force Ship ‘Yiyang’ In Port for Rest and Replenishment for the First Time”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network],
August 14, 2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_08/14/16787648_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军常州舰到吉补
给休整 [“Chinese-funded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Changzhou to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 吉布
提经商处 [PRC Economic and Commercial Office in Djibouti], August 19, 2012,
http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201208/20120808292252.shtml; 中国第 13 批护航编队首次靠港补给 [“Thirteenth
Chinese Escort Task Force Conducts In-Port Replenishment for First Time”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], December 3,
2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_12/03/19780766_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军衡阳舰到吉补给休整
[“Chinese-funded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Hengyang to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 吉布提经商处
[PRC Economic and Commercial Office in Djibouti], December 8, 2012,
http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201212/20121208473286.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我护航海军青海湖舰到
吉补给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Chinese Naval Escort Ship Qinghaihu to
Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 14, 2012, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t998175.htm; 驻吉布提大使张庆国率队欢迎我海军第十三批护航编队 570 舰来吉补给休整
[“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Thirteenth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship 570 to
Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 3, 2013,
http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lqbb/t1010571.shtml; 中国驻吉布提大使馆与中国海军第十三批护航编队 568 舰共度新春佳节
[“Chinese Embassy in Djibouti Celebrates Sprint Festival with Ship 568 of the Thirteenth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force”], 驻
吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 10, 2013, http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lqbb/t1013258.shtml; 中国海军第 14
批护航编队停靠吉布提港补给 [“14th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中
国广播网 [China National Radio], June 8, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/hd2011/2013/06-08/212040.shtml; 我海军哈尔
滨舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Ship Ha’erbin Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC
Embassy in Djibouti], July 25, 2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1061795.htm; 海军第十四批护航编队慰问吉布提
乒乓球协会 [“14th Naval Escort Task Force Visits Ping Pong Association in Djibouti”], 中华人民共和国外交部 [PRC Foreign
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Ministry], July 30, 2013, https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJBzp9; 我海军绵阳舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval
Ship Mianyang Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 30, 2013,
http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1062686.htm; 我海军护航官兵与海外侨胞共同庆祝建军节 [“Chinese Naval Escort
Troops Celebrate PLA Founding with Overseas Chinese Compatriots”], 中国海军 [Chinese Navy], August 3, 2013,
http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-08/03/content_5428710.htm; 第十五批护航编队井冈山舰停靠吉布提开始第二轮补给 [“15th
Escort Task Force Ship Jinggangshan Stops in Djibouti to Begin Second Round of Replenishment”], 中国海军 [China Navy],
October 8, 2013, http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-10/08/content_5569719_4.htm; 我海军太湖舰到吉布提休整补给 [“Chinese
Naval Ship Taihu Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 14,
2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1089228.htm; 我海军护航编队衡水舰到吉布提休整补给 [“Chinese Escort Task
Force Ship Hengshui Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 21,
2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1091330.htm; 中国海军护航编队洛阳舰停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval
Escort Task Force Ship Luoyang Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Online],
February 22, 2014, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2014_02/22/34083485_0.shtml; 建佳, 李秀林 [Jian Jia, Li Xiulin], 第
十六批护航编队太湖舰进行舰体安全探摸作业 [“16th Escort Task Force Ship Taihu Conducts Ship Safety Inspection Work”],
中国海军网 [China Navy Online], March 15, 2014, http://navy.81.cn/content/2014-03/15/content_5812204_6.htm; 在护航中成
长 – 海军太湖舰入列一周年纪事 [“Growing Up in Escort Operations – Chronicling a Week of the Naval Ship Taihu”], 中国新
闻网 [China News Network], July 11, 2014, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2014-07-11/202130506942.shtml; 李晓, 胡全福 [Li Xiao,
Hu Quanfu], 海军第十六批护航编队盐城舰靠泊吉布提补给休整 [“16th Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yancheng Stops in
Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Online], April 2, 2014,
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140402/40000508_0.shtml; 李晓, 胡全福 [Li Xiao, Hu Quanfu], 海军第十六批护航编队盐城舰靠泊
吉布提补给休整 [“16th Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yancheng Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国军网
[China Military Online], April 3, 2014, http://photo.81.cn/pla/2014-04/03/content_5838714.htm; 第 17 批护航编队停靠吉布提
港开始第 3 轮补给休整 [“17th Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti Port to Begin its Third Round of Rest and Replenishment”],
中国海军网 [China Navy Online], June 30, 2014, http://ocean.china.com.cn/2014-06/30/content_32812555.htm; 我海军护航编
队常州舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Changzhou Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and
Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 5, 2014, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1171818.htm;
我海军护航编队巢湖舰来吉补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Chaohu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and
Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 11, 2014, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1173818.htm; 第 17 批护航编队开始第 4 轮靠港补给休整 [“17th Escort Task Force Begins Fourth
Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], July 31, 2014,
http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0731/c1011-25374303.html; 中国海军第十八批护航编队首次停靠吉布提港 [“18th
Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti for the First Time”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government Portal],
September 9, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-09/09/content_2747108.htm; 中国海军护航编队运城舰到吉布提补给休
整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yuncheng Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中华人民共和国外交
部 [PRC Foreign Ministry], September 15, 2014, https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJFyC1; 肖永, 甘俊, 孙海潮 [Xiao
Yong, Gan Jun, Sun Haichao], 中国海军第十八批护航编队靠泊吉布提港休整 [“18th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops
in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], November 4, 2014,
http://www.81.cn/hj/2014-11/04/content_6209968.htm; 海军第十九批护航编队停靠吉布提补给休整 [“19th Naval Escort Task
Force Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], January 26, 2015,
http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0126/c172467-26453396.html; 我海军护航编队 550 号潍坊舰停靠吉布提港补给休整
[“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship 550 Weifang Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC
Embassy in Djibouti], February 1, 2015, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1233282.htm; 海军第十九批护航编队在国外开
展学雷锋活动 [“19th Naval Escort Task Force Conducts Leifeng Education Activities Overseas”], 中国新闻网 [China News
Network], March 7, 2015, http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2015/0307/c1057-26653494.html; 中国海军舰艇编队顺利完成撤离在
也门中方人员任务 [“Chinese Naval Ship Formation Successfully Completes Evacuation Mission of Chinese Personnel from
Yemen”], 新华网 [Xinhua], March 31, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2015-03/31/c_1114821991.htm; 第二批撤离也
门的中国公民抵达吉布提: ‘终于可以回家了!’ [“Second Group of Evacuated Chinese Nationals from Yemen Arrive in
Djibouti: ‘Can Finally Go Home!’”], 新华网 [Xinhua], March 31, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/201503/31/c_1114827585.htm; 我海军第二十批护航编队济南舰来吉布提补给休整 [“20th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship
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批护航编队哈尔滨舰来吉布提补给休整 [“24th Naval Escort Task Force Ship Ha’erbin Comes to Djibouti for Rest and
Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 3, 2016, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1403415.htm; 海军第二十四批护航编队邯郸舰来吉布提补给休整 [“24th Naval Escort Task Force
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Ship Dongpinghu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 15,
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海军第二十五批护航编队洪湖舰和玉林舰前后离靠吉布提港 [“25th Naval Escort Task Force Ships Honghu and Yulin Stop
Djibouti Port One After the Other”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], March 22, 2017, http://dj.chinaembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1447734.htm; 海军第二十五批护航编队洪湖舰和玉林舰前后离靠吉布提港 [“25th Naval Escort Task
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[“PLA Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti Military Port”], 多维新闻 [DW News], May 16, 2017,
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[“Chinese Naval Hospital Ship ‘Peace Ark’ Visits Djibouti”], 驻吉布提使馆经商处 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti – Economic and

47
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20, 2018, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1560824.htm; 我海军第二十九批护航编队千岛湖舰停靠吉布提港补给休整
[“29th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Qiandaohu Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆
[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 28, 2018, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1562962.htm; 张海龙, 来永雷 [Zhang
Hailong, Lai Yonglei], 我海军第 30 批护航编队开始首轮靠港补给休整 [“30th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Begins First
Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], September 11, 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/201809/11/content_4824620.htm; 卓瑞生大使迎接中国海军第 30 批护航编队邯郸舰、东平湖舰来吉布提补给休整
[“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes the 30th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ships Handan and Dongpinghu to Djibouti
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[“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 30th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Wuhu to Djibouti for Rest and
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中国海军第 31 批护航编队骆马湖舰来吉布提补给休整 [“Ambassador Zhuo Ruisheng Welcomes 31st Chinese Naval Escort
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